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ABSTRACT

ABJECTION IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE

Robin Imholte

In this project, I examine three major British works of literature produced in the
last two decades of the nineteenth century: Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case
of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Thomas
Hardy’s Jude the Obscure. I show that these works reflect popular trends and fears that
arose during this time, including notions of decadence and fears of degeneration. Using
Julia Kristeva’s conception of abjection, as described in her work Powers of Horror, I
argue that developments throughout the Victorian era: namely the advent of the theory of
evolution, the rise and expansion of large-scale industrialization, and the moral and
economic benefits and ramifications of global colonization, ultimately led to social and
individual insecurities that reverberated throughout popular literature of the time. I
conclude that these cultural attitudes and insecurities can be seen reflected in works of
literature and in their depiction of characters and behaviors whose self-abjection are a
reflection of a society with an unstable self-image.
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1
INTRODUCTION: LATE VICTORIAN ABJECTION AND “THE IMPOSSIBLE
WITHIN”

The study that follows is formed from two approaches. The first approach takes a
direct look at a particular place and time, in this case Britain in the last full decade of the
nineteenth century. This, I argue, was a time of social upheaval. If the Victorian era is to
be seen as a time of progress, and in many ways it was, then late Victorian thought can be
viewed as reflective of that progress, its benefits, and especially, its harms. The
nineteenth century had witnessed many changes for Britain—the furtherance of colonial
ambition culminating in the establishment of an Empire, the increasing swell of city
populations driven by industrial need, and the rise of scientific ideas that included an
understanding of evolution by natural selection, to name a few—which had, by the end of
the century, created an air of foreboding and pessimism. I examine through the literature
of the era this effect on late Victorian society. The second approach to this study is a
psychological inquiry into the nature of abjection, as theorized by Julia Kristeva, and the
manifestation of abjection in the individuals caught up in a fluctuating, complex, and
uncertain society. My argument posits that the late Victorian era possessed an unstable
self-image, brought about by the weight of imperialism and the effects of change, which
can be read in popular Gothic literature of the time.
Anyone who wishes to fully demarcate a line between one historical period and
the next is bound to run into some difficulties. History doesn’t work like that. When we
speak of the Victorian era, or the Edwardian—or when we speak of modernism, pre-
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modernism, or postmodernism—we must always remind ourselves not to get too caught
up in convenient labels. Societies in history and their accompanying literatures are
always influenced by what came before, and they directly influence what comes after.
Try as we might to create them, no clear lines exist between one historical period and the
next. So, when a scholar like myself focuses her lens on a specific time and place, I
cannot view it as a paleontologist views a fossil trapped in amber. My subject is fluid,
moving, influenced by forces it cannot fully understand. This rule applies to location as
well. All the works studied in this thesis take place within the borders of England proper.
They are domestic novels, with domestic characters and domestic concerns. But though
the world outside England is rarely, if ever, directly addressed in these novels, there is a
world beyond which the Britain of this time period is deeply invested in.
It is no stretch to envision the entirety of Queen Victoria’s reign as an era of
constant flux. The Victorians, as with any society that witnesses marked social changes in
a short amount of time, often viewed these changes warily. By the early 1890s, when this
study begins, the Victorians had already experienced rapid acceleration and dramatic
upheavals in their worldview. As early as the 1830s, industrialization with its
accompanying machinery and social benefits and pitfalls had been well underway for
some time. In 1829 Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle was already writing of the
“crisis” of the age (33). This crisis, according to Carlyle, was the result of a growing
industrial society and the increased mechanization of society it brought about. “Were we
required to characterize this age of ours by any single epithet,” he wrote, “we should be
tempted to call it, not an Heroical, Devotional, Philosophical, or Moral Age, but, above
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all others, the Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward
sense of that word. The age which…teaches and practices the great art of adapting means
to ends” (34). Carlyle, somewhat ominously, predicted that increased mechanization
would lead to the diminishment of individual thought and creation. As a result of the
labor required by industrialization, formerly rural populations swarmed to the cities in
search of work. This often led to urban overpopulation, unhealthy and meagre living
conditions, and a life that lacked leisure or opportunity for the poorest of workers. The
quality of life was not improved for the lowliest populations who were all but forgotten
under the march of progress.
Also during this time, the British Empire was transforming the world into the one
we are familiar with today. While British laws, culture, language, and literature were all
being exported to the furthest colonies, there was also an influx of foreign culture that
affected Britain itself. Artists, collectors, and connoisseurs found inspiration in foreign art
and design, often importing foreign artifacts and incorporating new aesthetic sensibilities
into their own creations. In France, and elsewhere in continental Europe, postImpressionist artists like Gauguin and Van Gogh drew inspiration from the Far East and
South Pacific societies. This new global sensibility also found its way to England, where
French-inspired artists and writers crafted their own cultural amalgamations (Thornton).
As the nineteenth century wore on, increased backlash against supposed “degeneration”
emerged. Research into notions such as “scientific racism” gained traction, and ideas of
“cultural degeneration” caused worry for older generations. Perhaps the most prominent
critic of “degenerate art” was Max Nordau, who in 1892 published the seminal work
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Degeneration, a work of part pseudo-science, part cultural criticism that portrayed
modern decadence as an illness that was causing the fall of “civilization.” For many, a
new sense of pessimism was the order of the day in fin de siècle Europe.
While happenings abroad made an impact on British society, and foreign
influence was always hovering on the fringes of even the most domestic of British
concerns, there were also ideas forming within England itself that would shake British
confidence. Since 1859, when Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species, the
theory of evolution by natural selection had disrupted the way humans viewed their
ancestry and their place of importance in the universe. The implications the theory held
for religion were profoundly felt, and the impact was no less revolutionary than
Copernicus declaring the Earth revolved around the sun. Whether people chose to accept
or deny natural selection as the explanation for life, the shockwaves reverberated, and for
many individuals, life suddenly seemed meaningless (Diniejko). Debates surrounding the
theory of evolution, its impact and its significance for social, religious, and political life,
gained prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century, and are indeed still
debated as of this writing. One of the concerns that an acceptance of biological evolution
brought about was the idea of devolution. Born partly from a misunderstanding of
evolutionary theory, many concerned thinkers came to the conclusion that if an organism
could evolve from a lower state to a higher state, who was to say an organism could not
devolve from a higher to lower state? Evolution unwittingly provided a frame of
reference for believers in degeneration such as Max Nordau and the criminologist Cesare
Lombroso.
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As my focus, I have chosen works that can easily fall into the category of
“Gothic.” By the time of this writing, in the early decades of the twenty-first century, the
term “Gothic” has taken on a plethora of meanings. Gothic literature, as an identifiable
genre, found its popularity roughly a century and a half previous to the current study’s
focus. (This is if one accepts, as is conventional, the first truly “Gothic” novel as Horace
Walpole’s 1764 romance The Castle of Otranto). By the late Victorian era, however,
Gothic literature had drifted from its literary roots. Apart from a few exceptions,
Victorian Gothic had become removed from the medieval castles and monasteries of its
namesake and replanted into an urban environment. Its characters are modern, they exist
in a modern environment, and supernatural elements, when they do occur, are often
established within a scientific framework rather than as the result of ancient family curses
or whatever motif eighteenth century Gothic used as its foundation. Rather than the
mysterious cosmic forces controlling the stock characters of traditional Gothic, the
characters commonly found in Victorian Gothic are confronted by what Kristeva termed
“the impossible within” that causes the subject to “[find] that the impossible constitutes
its very being, that it is none other than abject” (5). Much of this internal struggle was the
result of what Brantlinger refers to as “imperial chauvinism” (8). This chauvinism can be
expressed either directly—through a fierce support of British conquest and domination
abroad—or indirectly, through a vague but certain belief in British superiority. (I would
specify this as “English” but since two of our authors, Stevenson and Wilde, originate in
Scotland and Ireland respectively, this would not be entirely accurate). As British
imperialism reached its zenith and nervousness began to set in, this resulted in a crisis of
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masculinity that deeply affected the generation these authors belong to. This crisis of
masculinity, while not the entire story, forms a large part of the culture through which
these works came about, and can be read in the works themselves.
In “Culture and Anarchy,” written over two decades prior to the time of our
current focus, Matthew Arnold urges his contemporaries to “[tend] towards sweetness
and light” (720) and to embrace the idea of the moral perfectibility of mankind. By the
end of the century, however, man was more often seen as an incurably immoral creature,
subject to his own selfishness, his animal nature, and the possibility of not just a moral
degeneration, but a physical one as well. Literature particularly began to hold a less
didactic, moral purpose than seen in previous decades. Aestheticism, with its art for art’s
sake motto, offered a more decadent view of creation. As Richard Altick explains it, this
is
[i]mportant for the effects upon the literature produced in those years [when]
intellectual life was troubled by the breakdown of the verities that had lent the
fifties and sixties an air of stability. The church’s influence over men’s minds
declined as decisively as did its influence over society and state. The
confrontation of religion and natural science produced an atmosphere of
secularism and skepticism. The Ruskinian “morality of art”…lost its authority and
was succeeded by an attitude toward aesthetic experience which had nothing to do
with morality…Later Victorian literature speaks with a quite different voice,
echoing the contemporary mood in which values were being drastically re-ordered
and intellectual energies were set working in new directions. (15-16)
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The literature of the 1890s, while still undoubtedly Victorian, is also witnessing glimmers
of the modernist movement of the twentieth century, during which many authors
expressed feelings of existential angst and, particularly during, between, and after the two
world wars, increasing despair.
In this study, I analyze three popular novels produced during this confused last
decade of the nineteenth century. I argue that each novel I look at reflects, through
abjection, a society that appears to be losing its grip on surety. In the first chapter, I
provide a short theoretical background on Julia Kristeva’s notion of abjection, including
my understanding of the social and psychological roots of abjection, and its importance to
my analysis. Chapter Two then examines Robert Louis Stevenson’s The Strange Case of
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Evolution, and its antithesis devolution, provided contextual
basis for Stevenson’s plot, and although the chapter does not delve too deeply into a
scientific discussion, it should be remembered that the idea of a socially and physically
devolved personality was not unheard of during the time of Stevenson’s writing. Chapter
Three looks at Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray. Wilde’s novel examines
questions of surface and depth, and asks the reader to consider whether a man’s
personality and morality is dependent on his image. The fourth and final chapter analyzes
Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure. While there were many contemporary social
considerations Hardy included in his final novel, this study focuses on the characters’
inner struggles, as outsiders in a misunderstanding and unforgiving community.
On a final note, the motif of the double appears, with more or less emphasis, in
each of these literary works. I do not find this surprising in a discussion of abjection as a
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psychological and social phenomenon. As explained more in depth in the chapter on
Kristeva, abjection is rooted in the body, and in the trauma one experiences. When
discussing a particular time and place—late nineteenth century Britain, in this case—
where abjection occurs, there is always a splitting of the self. As Kristeva explains it,
when abjection occurs, “repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside himself”
(2). Abjection does not tolerate easy unification within the body, and it does not promote
wholeness. Born as it is from the primal separation between mother and newborn,
abjection in its very nature separates the self from the object of horror it encounters. For
late Victorian writers and readers, this separation is caused by the unstable position of
society itself, which the individual then internalizes. Victorian culture, following a long
European tradition, was obsessed with the idea of the “Other.” Whether racial, sexual,
religious, or otherwise, Britons had long been fascinated, and repulsed, by the appearance
and existence of the Other. When society no longer has the cultural assurances it depends
on, individuals may find themselves looking in the mirror and recognizing that the Other
is often no other than themselves.

9
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: KRISTEVA AND ABJECTION

The Oxford English Dictionary defines abjection as “the state or condition of
being cast down or brought low” or “the action or an act of casting down, humbling, or
degrading; an act of debasement, esp. of oneself.” It is a pre-modern word, dating from at
least the middle ages, and it often, though not always, has religious connotations. In
Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva redefined abjection, and theorized on its psychological,
cultural, and historical roots. For Kristeva, abjection is no longer simply an act of
abasement—although abasement does appear in her analysis—but rather it takes on a
deeper, more profoundly and psychologically complex signification. Although it
manifests itself in various, often diverse, ways, abjection is a phenomenon that can
arguably be found in every culture known to mankind, as universal as it is unassimilable,
and as foundational as it is inescapable. At times its presence is more overtly seen and
felt than at other times but it is always there, rooted in the very foundation of the human
psyche. It is, according to Kristeva, “an inescapable boomerang, a vortex of summons
and repulsion [that] places the one haunted by it literally beside himself” (1).
So what, then, is abjection, according to Kristeva? And where does it come from?
As a trained psychoanalyst, Kristeva draws heavily on the theories of Freud and Lacan in
her search for an explanation. As these theories are well known, I see no need to draw
them out here. I will, however, note that Kristeva’s ideas of abjection are rooted in the
Oedipal triad of psychoanalytic theory. Abjection, in this view, is primal and pre-verbal.
The primary abjection experienced by the individual lies in the initial separation from the
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mother, and it “preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the
immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order
to be” (10). Thus, the first instance of abjection in the individual occurs in synchronicity
with the first appearance of separation, the eventual rejection of the mother, and the
formation of an I as opposed to Another/an Other. As a result, “[t]he abject confronts
us…within our personal archaeology, with our earliest attempts to release the hold of
maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the autonomy of language”
(13). As a result, abjection is deeply tied to identity, a topic I will set aside for the
moment, but one that I will return to frequently throughout this paper, as it is essential to
my thesis.
The trouble with defining abjection as Kristeva does is that, for her “abjection is
above all ambiguity” (9). It is not even, in its very essence, signifiable, because “the
twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by such a name does not have, properly
speaking, a definable object…which I name or imagine” (1). “The abject,” according to
Kristeva, “has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (1). However,
abjection must not be confused with what is merely the “object” or the “Other”, for “[i]f
the object…through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for
meaning…what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (2). Although in some ways it may
resemble Freud’s observations regarding “the uncanny,” abjection is “[e]ssentially
different…more violent, too…elaborated through a failure to recognize its kin [where]
nothing is familiar, not even the shadow of a memory” (5). Abjection is “related to
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perversion…because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a law; but
turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to
deny them” (15). Above all, abjection is “what disturbs identity, system, order” (4). It
may be tempting to think of abjection in this way as a form of nihilism, but to do this
would be a mistake. Abjection is, rather
a massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have
been in an opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as radically separate,
loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A “something” that I do not
recognize as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing
insignificant, and which crushes me. On the edge of non-existence and
hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject
and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my culture. (2) (Italics mine)
Perhaps paradoxically, abjection, cast off, rejected, and without a stable object of
its own, is essential for the maintenance of social order. Humankind has, from our
hunter/gatherer days in the shadowy millennia of our beginnings, sought to create order
from our surroundings. This desire to find order and meaning is evidenced by the
numerous remnants of art and artifacts that survive from prehistoric times.
“Significance,” wrote Kristeva, “is indeed inherent in the human body” (10). We need not
even consciously create symbolism; the human imagination, as witnessed by the ubiquity
of complex symbolism manifested throughout all the varying observed cultures, naturally
finds the symbolic in the ordinary. It follows that if human thought and culture seeks to
find meaning in the world around it, abjection is the unseen force that both destroys and
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creates meaning. Defined by Kristeva as “what disturbs identity, system, order” (4),
abjection is also essential to the development and maintenance of culture, as it delineates,
both symbolically and often physically, “what must be thrust aside in order to live” (3).
Being “neither subject nor object” (1), abjection nevertheless inhabits the borders, or the
“interspace,” of both (48). It occupies the liminal sphere between what is acceptable and
what is taboo, or between what is Self and what is Other. Although it is, in itself, not
signifiable, abjection can nevertheless attach itself, either or both culturally and
individually, to signifiable objects, symbols of the abject. These symbols may appear to
vary among cultures and individuals, yet they all refer back to primal abjection, which
is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the individual as well as on the
collective level. By virtue of this, abjection…is a universal phenomenon; one
encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or social dimension of man is
constituted, and this throughout the course of civilization. But abjection assumes
specific shapes and different codings according to the various “symbolic
systems.” (68)
Abjection, as experienced by the individual and/or the collective, finds its beginnings in
the psyche, from which it emerges and becomes concrete. It asserts itself through cultural
ideas of the taboo. What is acceptable and what is taboo varies among different cultures,
but the social concept of the taboo, at once enacted, attractive, and ritually thrust aside, is
universal. Abjection is the driving, primal force that
confronts us…with those fragile states where man strays on the territories of
animal. Thus, by way of abjection, primitive societies have marked out a precise
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area of their culture in order to remove it from the threatening world of animals
and animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and murder” (12).
This forces us to acknowledge that the abject, represented by what we may deem
unpleasant, disorderly, or something that must be physically or ritually rejected, is also
necessary to the maintenance of culture and identity. Cultural and/or religious
prohibitions—rules regarding, for example, cleanliness, menstruation and the feminine,
or the prohibition of certain foods, to name just a few—are perhaps the most obvious
enactments of the abject, and the necessary rejection of such indications of the abject in
society brings about meaning and order to the social system. As abjection is intimately
tied up with prohibition and taboo, and as it rests on the border between what is proper
and what is not, abjection is most commonly experienced, even embraced, in instances
where such boundaries become blurred.
I briefly indicated above that abjection is essential to identity and identity
formation. This is evident, of course, in one’s identification with, or conversely one’s
conscious rejection of, one’s culture. If we accept its veracity, the primal separation from
the mother is the primary experience of abjection. But it does not end there. Abjection
may assert itself in the superficial rituals and prohibitions of culture and society, but it
only truly becomes real when one experiences it, viscerally and even violently. In this,
abjection is, ultimately, a personal feeling, not necessarily divorced from one’s
surroundings but rather informed by them. It is within the individual that abjection asserts
itself, transitioning “from unnamable to namable” (34) and becoming, at last, a sign. “To
be sure,” wrote Kristeva,
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[i]f I am affected by what does not yet appear to me as a thing, it is because laws,
connections, and even structures of meaning govern and condition me. That order,
that glance, that voice, that gesture, which enact the law for my frightened body,
constitute and bring about an effect and not yet a sign. I speak to it in vain in
order to exclude it from what will no longer be, for myself, a world that can be
assimilated. Obviously, I am only like someone else: mimetic logic of the advent
of the ego, objects and signs. But when I seek (myself), lose (myself), or
experience jouissance—then “I” is heterogeneous. Discomfort, unease, dizziness
stemming from an ambiguity that, through the violence of a revolt against,
demarcates a space out of which signs and objects arise. Thus braided, woven,
ambivalent, a heterogeneous flux marks out a territory that I can call my own
because the Other, having dwelt in me as alter ego, points it out to me through
loathing. (10)
The individual, or the ego, depends on structure or what Lacan referred to as the Name of
the Father, which facilitates entrance into language and the Symbolic Order in order to
gain meaning. If we are conditioned into a cultural and social order, then we must,
initially at least, identify with that structure in a homogeneous fashion, just as the infant
initially identifies with the mother. It is part of what Lacan meant when he said that our
“desire is the desire of the Other.” On a social level, this means that the individual will
desire what the structure desires; our wants (want as in wishing, not want as in lacking),
though they may seem wholly individual, are really the wants dictated by language, and
the social and familial order. Through mimesis, we come into understanding in
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correspondence with that social order. Abjection, and the abject, represent the inverse of
that order. Abjection arises through the rejection of social codings. It is “when all is said
and done…the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the
sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies” (209). The resulting jouissance
that abjection inspires, following Lacan’s understanding, is tied up with both pleasure and
pain. It is an excess of both that results in a disorienting condition that both defines and
destroys identity. “I experience abjection,” Kristeva asserted, “only if an Other has settled
in place and stead of what will be ‘me.’ Not at all an other with whom I identify and
incorporate, but an Other who precedes and possesses me, and through such possession
causes me to be” (10). The implied result is a transformation, through abjection, of the
individual. One not only experiences abjection, one becomes the abject. One should keep
in mind that what is abject is always defined by the conditioning society. What is
considered acceptable for one society is often taboo for another. What causes the
experience of abjection is highly dependent on individual experience and is less
important than the universal experience of abjection itself. What is abject is defined by
the conditioning society.
Ultimately, all abjection is self-abjection. Even the most outwardly superficial
forms of abjection stimulate a violent, personal transformation. Of experiencing food
abjection, “perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection,” Kristeva
described an outward retching, akin to a violent illness, in which “I expel myself, I spit
myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish
myself…During the course in which ‘I’ become, I give birth to myself amid the violence
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of sobs, of vomit” (3). It is an inner horror, of the most basic and primal sort, that casts
out the physical body, or, rather, makes the physical body itself the abject, even while the
ego resides within it. Abjection cannot be removed from experience while one is enclosed
in a body that continually produces the most primal representation of abjection—bodily
fluids. Describing “the horror within,” Kristeva wrote that the “body’s inside…shows up
in order to compensate for the collapse of the border between inside and outside. It is as if
the skin, a fragile container, no longer guaranteed the integrity of one’s ‘own and clean
self’ but, scraped or transparent, invisible or taut, gave way before the dejection of its
contents” (53). The moment one turns away from abjection, embracing the safety of
ritual, or of the Law, one is returned to it, for “from its place of banishment, the abject
does not cease challenging its master” (2).
At its extreme, perhaps, the one under the grip of abjection—the one who
becomes the Abject—ends up embracing his/her abjection, becoming the willing
recipient and carrier of such abjection. This could arise from an unexplained upset in the
familial or social order, or an eventual rejection of such an order. Such figures are not
rare; nor, in fact, are they so easily recognized, or so quickly shunned as it might first
seem. “For he is not mad,” wrote Kristeva, “he through whom the abject exists” (6). Such
figures of the abject are essentially willing exiles, if Kristeva is to be believed, and they
are the characters that form the foundation of my thesis. So, then, how does one
understand such a figure? According to Kristeva:
The one by whom the abject exists is thus a deject who places (himself),
separates (himself), situates (himself), and therefore strays instead of getting his
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bearings, desiring, belonging, or refusing…Necessarily dichotomous, somewhat
Manichaean, he divides, excludes, and without, properly speaking, wishing to
know his abjections is not at all unaware of them. Often, moreover, he includes
himself among them, thus casting within himself the scalpel that carries out his
separations. (8)
The portrait Kristeva has painted of the “one by whom the abject exists,” the exile, the
deject, is a fascinated, and not wholly negative, one. For, as to the destiny of such a
figure, according to Kristeva, “the more he strays, the more he is saved” (8). He can
almost, if one is willing to accept it, become a symbol of desire, both desire as Lacan
understood it and desire as is commonly understood by the layperson. For Kristeva, it is
within such a figure that one recognizes jouissance, which for Lacan signified the
excessive intermingling of pleasure and pain: pleasure that brings pain, and pain that
brings pleasure. “Such,” wrote Kristeva, “are the pangs and delights of masochism” (5).
Furthermore, there is an aura of seduction surrounding the subject-turned-abject. Kristeva
proposed, not without a hint of grandiosity, that “it is out of such straying on excluded
ground that [the abject] draws his jouissance. The abject from which he does not cease
separating is for him, in short, a land of oblivion that is constantly remembered. Once
upon blotted-out time, the abject must have been a magnetized pole of covetousness” (8).
From this, Kristeva concluded that “[t]he time of abjection is double: a time of oblivion
and thunder, of veiled infinity and the moment when revelation bursts forth” (9).
Histrionics aside, Kristeva proposed that

18
jouissance alone causes the abject to exist as such. One does not know it, one does
not desire it, one joys in it…Violently and painfully. A passion. And, as in
jouissance where the object of desire…bursts with the shattered mirror where the
ego gives up its image in order to contemplate itself in the Other, there is nothing
either objective or objectal to the abject. It is simply a frontier, a repulsive gift
that the Other, having become alter ego, drops so that ‘I’ does not disappear in it
but finds, in that sublime alienation, a forfeited existence. (9)
As a result of this, Kristeva concludes that “[o]ne thus understands why so many
victims of the abject are its fascinated victims—if not its submissive and willing ones”
(9). Abjection, in such instances, is intimately connected to the sublime, as both the
abject and the sublime trigger otherworldly experiences where “I…find myself removed
to a secondary universe, set off from the one where ‘I’ am—delight and loss,” and which
“expands us, overstrains us, and causes us to be both here, as dejects, and there, as others
and sparkling” (12). This echoes Edmund Burke’s eighteenth century description of “the
passion caused by the great and sublime in nature,” which
is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions
are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely
filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason
on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that,
far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on
by an irresistible force. Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime
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in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect.
(Burke)
In such instances, one may be able to see how the abject, like the sublime, causes the
individual at once pleasure wrapped up in pain, and a moment outside the ennui of the
ordinary social order.
We have seen, then, that abjection, as the inverse of Law, resembles something
like a two-headed figure. As a figurative boundary separating order and disorder, or self
and other, abjection inhabits the shadows between light and dark. Abjection is what must
be repelled in order to maintain a stable sense of social and cultural identity; it is also,
sometimes, embraced by those symbolic “exiles” who find themselves split between
dichotomies of subject/object, self/Other, inside/outside, or even savior/monster. My
thesis is concerned with characters who exemplify such dichotomies. It is at this point
that I hope the reader does not fall into the fallacy of black/white thinking in which there
are clearly demarcated lines between cleanliness and filth, good and evil, or even self and
other. In my understanding, abjection has little regard for such easy and helpful
definitions. Abjection, rather, inhabits that gray space between such demarcations, and
that is what makes it both so tempting and so insidious. The characters I examine in this
paper are victims of abjection. Each and every one of them claims a degree of complicity
in their fall into the abject—to varying degrees. Yet abjection is, ultimately, a force that
overpowers them, and takes them further into the void than they intend; such falls are not
recognized until it is too late. According to Kristeva:

20
If it be true that the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject,
one can understand that it is experienced at the peak of its strength when that
subject, weary of fruitless attempts to identify with something on the outside,
finds the impossible within; when it finds that the impossible constitutes its very
being, that it is none other than the abject. The abjection of self would be the
culminating form of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all
its objects are based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its
very being. There is nothing like the abjection of self to show that all abjection is
in fact recognition of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire
is founded…But if one imagines (and imagine one must, for it is the working of
imagination whose foundations are being laid here) the experience of want itself
as logically preliminary to being and object—to the being of the object—then one
understands that abjection, and even more so abjection of self, is its only
signified. Its signifier, then, is none but literature. (5) (Italics in the original)
It is thus through literature that I embark on my examination of the abject, as seen
through the eyes of those characters who find “the impossible within,” and are unable to
find a way out.
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“MORE THAN A SON’S INDIFFERENCE”: ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON’S THE
STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE

I. Story of the Double
Recalling the metaphysical research that would eventually cause his undoing, Dr.
Henry Jekyll M.D., D.C.L., LL.D, F.R.S. (13), trained in medicine and law, a man of
good social standing and all around respectable personage has, too late, discovered a fatal
truth. To friend and lawyer Mr. Utterson, he writes,
I thus drew steadily nearer to that truth, by whose partial discovery I have been
doomed to such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one but truly two…I
hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of
multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens. I for my part, from the
nature of my life, advanced infallibly in one direction and in one direction only. It
was on the moral side, and in my own person, that I learned to recognize the
thorough and primitive duality of man. (48) (Italics mine)
The result is, by now, well known. Indeed, the story of Dr. Jekyll and his alter-ego, the
nefarious Mr. Hyde, is arguably the most famous story of the double to arise in modern
times. It has grown far beyond its humble beginnings as a penny dreadful and beyond its
status (as Stevenson’s wife Fanny insisted it was) of an allegory, and straight into modern
consciousness. One need not have read the novella itself to be familiar with its contents.
More than a hundred years after its writing, “Jekyll and Hyde” has become as
commonplace a cultural motif as its fellow nineteenth century monsters—Dracula and
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Frankenstein’s creature—superseding its source material and becoming a fixture of the
cultural landscape. Retold countless times through theater, film, and literature, the tale
has even been, in the words of one critic, “harmed by its popularity” (Saposnik 108).
Anyone coming into a serious study of Jekyll and Hyde must work to consciously
reject the simplified version of the tale that popular culture has created: that Jekyll and
Hyde is a simple, moralistic tale of good and evil. For in Jekyll and Hyde, as Peter K.
Garrett points out, “[o]n the level of character and action as well as on the level of
narration, we find neither unity nor purified duality but a complex weave of voices that
resists conservative simplifications” (67). Hyde is a double, but not in the traditional
sense. Unlike most tales of the double in literature, Hyde does not exist outside the
physical body of Jekyll, nor does he resemble Jekyll in appearance. Hyde, rather, lives
within Jekyll’s own skin; transformed, surely, but made from the same physical matter.
Hyde’s sins, too, did not make their entrance into the world independently of Jekyll; they
existed within Jekyll long prior to Jekyll’s physical transformation into the figure of
Hyde. Furthermore, it is not just Jekyll that Hyde doubles and threatens, but his
companions as well, as all who encounter Hyde are drawn into his sordid, symbolic,
abject power. Hyde is a reminder not just of Jekyll’s own failings but of the failings and
hypocrisies of Stevenson’s Victorian society. The abjection that Hyde represents is not
just Hyde’s own disgusting nature but the disgust already within respectable “society”
itself. Hyde, with his unexplainable rottenness, is everyone’s double.
Appearance of the Double in literature did not, obviously, begin with the
Victorian Era. Rather, “doubles and duality…have a long and distinguished literary
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career” (Dryden 39). However, critics have noted that Victorian fascination with the dual
aspect of mankind enjoyed a boost in popularity as the era drew on. In The Divided Self,
Masao Miyoshi’s full-length study of “the ways in which Victorian men of letters
experienced the self-division endemic to their times and gave expression to it in their
writing”, he noted the “confusion, the perplexity, the deep unease of the English
nineteenth century [that is] impressed on all who study the period” (ix). This is
particularly seen, Miyoshi continues, in the “[d]istinctions among the several themes of
self-duplication and self-division [that] arise from the source of the second self or partial
self.” Miyoshi distinguishes within this theme subthemes of duplication and division. In
the latter, “as in the Jekyll-Hyde personality, it [the double] splits off from within” (xii).
For Miyoshi, this distinction is not as important as “what is essential to both, the
disintegration of the person” (xii). Philosophers in the Western tradition have long
studied the nature of mankind, both social and individual. The Ancient Greeks exhorted
mankind to “know thyself.” Christian ontology long held that the world was a site of
opposing struggles: good vs evil, body vs soul, heaven vs hell. These thoughts were
passed down, almost wholly intact, from ancient to modern times. Advancements in the
nineteenth century, however, confused much of this dichotomous thinking. With the
introduction of Darwinism and the development of modern psychology, as well as rapid
industrialization and the consequent changes in social formations and realities, it is not
surprising that many were confused about identity. Where once man stood on the
pinnacle of God-breathed creation, Darwinism had reintroduced him to his animal nature,
exposing him as just another production in an evolutionary chain. If mankind could—and
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did—evolve from lesser primates, what was to say he couldn’t go backwards, devolve, or
degeneratex once more into a lower species? Added to this newly emergent paranoia
regarding mankind’s place in the universe was an overall sense of cultural fatigue felt
among many of Stevenson’s fin de siècle contemporaries, who began to feel doubt about
Western European man’s seemingly irreversible progress. For centuries, the Western
European male felt himself at the apex of the world: culturally, biologically, and
ethically. However, by Stevenson’s time, many sensed a growing “malaise of lateVictorian Britain” in which “revulsion at hypocrisy is part of what Stevenson’s
biographers have repeatedly pointed to—his participation in his generation’s
disaffiliation from organized religion and enthusiasm for Darwin and other secular
thinkers” which resulted in Jekyll and Hyde “reflecting the widely recognized ‘autumnal’
quality of late-Victorian life, the sense that something was the matter not simply at home
but in society itself” (Veeder 116). What was at stake in all this was identity itself, and
Stevenson’s novella is no less than a study of identity, in the form of the double.
Readers familiar with the double know that good things rarely follow its
appearance. It is perhaps the ultimate instance of the uncanny in literature and
psychology. The double is, quite literally, the Other in the self that Kristeva would argue
we are always already abjecting. The double is the physical representation of ourselves
that must be abjected as something improper, unclean, or otherwise threatening to the
social order. The individual may embrace the altered part of himself (as Jekyll initially
embraces Hyde), or reject it outright (as Jekyll ultimately, through his suicide, succeeds
in doing) but the double can only be created through the individual. Thus, the “literature
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of duality is, at its most obvious level, a literature about identity, or even lack of identity”
(Dryden 39), and is “a threat to the integrity of the self, and frequently evidence of a
Gothic, supernatural force at large that brings with it death and destruction” (Dryden 38).
The double, or doppelganger, theme is one that Stevenson himself had attempted,
with varying success, to put on paper before writing Jekyll and Hyde. In “A Chapter on
Dreams” (published in Scribner’s Magazine in 1888, two years after the publication of
Jekyll and Hyde), Stevenson admits that he “had long been trying to write a story on this
subject, to find a body, a vehicle for that strong sense of man’s double being which must
at times come in upon and overwhelm the mind of every thinking creature” (127). This
searching came to fruition when, under financial pressure, Stevenson recalls, he
went about racking my brains for a plot of any sort; and on the second night I
dreamed the scene at the window, and a scene afterward split in two, in which
Hyde, pursued for some crime, took the powder and underwent the change in the
presence of his pursuers. All the rest was made awake, and consciously, although
I think I can trace in much of it the manner of my Brownies. The meaning of the
tale is therefore mine, and had long pre-existed in my garden of Adonis, and tried
one body after another in vain; indeed, I do most of the morality, worse luck! And
my Brownies have not a rudiment of what we call a conscious. Mine, too, is the
setting, mine the characters. All that was given me was the matter of three scenes,
and the central idea of a voluntary change becoming involuntary. Will it be
thought ungenerous, after I have been so literally ladling out praise to my unseen
collaborators, if I here toss them over, bound hand and foot, into the arena of the
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critics? For the business of the powders, which so many have censured, is, I am
relieved to say, not mine at all but the Brownies’. (127)
There are two things in Stevenson’s description of his process of creation that I would
like to briefly point out. Firstly, and most immediately apparent, is the acknowledgment
of dreams in the creative process. Stevenson’s examination of his own dreams predates
the rise of Freud and psychoanalysis, with its own focus on the significance of dreams, by
only a few years. (Dreams also play a small part in the narrative of Jekyll and Hyde itself,
as when Utterson finds “his imagination…engaged or almost enslaved” by the image of
Hyde that “had no face, or one that baffled him and melted before his eyes” [15]).
Secondly, Stevenson here, whether he is aware of it or not, unloads onto his dreams the
very scapegoating that Jekyll and his companions unload onto Hyde. Stevenson’s
Brownies, who do his dirty work for him, are invented figures whom Stevenson is able to
indulge and blame for the more feverish aspects of his mind and personality. Whether
intentional or not, and I am inclined to believe it is intentional, Stevenson is, Jekyll-like,
examining his own duality, casting praise and blame on his collaborators wherever he
sees fit. They are both of him and separate from him. How much of Stevenson is in Jekyll
can, up to a point, only be a matter of speculation.
II. The Name(s) of the “Father”(s)
Critics have long noted the male-centered nature of Jekyll and Hyde. There are
few women in the narrative, and those who do appear, with the possible exception of the
caretaker of Hyde’s Soho residence, an “ivory-faced and silvery-haired old woman” who
“had an evil face, smoothed by hypocrisy” but whose “manners were excellent” (23), are
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all, in some form or another, victims. All main characters are unmarried; there are no
mothers, no love interests, and perhaps most importantly, acknowledgment of this lack.
These seemingly respectable, professional men of the world, well-to-do doctors and
lawyers, are really rather isolated in their community of bachelors. Some critics have
argued for the necessity of this male-dominated narration, insisting that it is integral to
the meaning of Jekyll and Hyde. Irving Saposnik reminds us that “Victoria’s era, despite
its monarch, was male-centered; and a story so directed at the essence of its moral
behavior is best seen from a male perspective” (110). While basically not inaccurate, this
explanation is, I would argue, shallow and unconvincing. There are countless Victorian
narratives that, while male-authored, male-narrated, or male-centered, do not exclude the
female presence from its pages to the extent that Jekyll and Hyde does. It also does not
address questions such as why the witness to Hyde’s most high profile crime, the murder
of Sir Danvers Carew, should be a “romantically given” female, and why her testimony is
the only one told third-hand, without a single direct quote. While I do not take for a given
Saposnik’s claim that “moral behavior is best seen from a male perspective” in Jekyll and
Hyde, it is an unarguable truth that the narrative is male dominated. So then it follows,
what are we to make of this?
Addressing the social organization of Stevenson’s world, William Veeder argues
that “Jekyll and Hyde dramatizes the inherent weakness of late-Victorian social
organization” (107). The
site of Jekyll and Hyde is…the larger milieu of late-Victorian patriarchy [in
which] Lanyon, Enfield, and Utterson participate so thoroughly in Jekyll/Hyde
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that they constitute an emblematic community, a relational network, which
reflects—and thus allows us readers a perspective on—the network of male bonds
in late-Victorian Britain. This network marks a psychological condition as a
cultural phenomenon…The resulting casualty is not simply Jekyll/Hyde but
culture itself” (108). The cause of this undoing lies in the “failure to resolve
Oedipal tensions. (154)
It is this “Oedipal antagonism [that] functions…as the latent cause of cultural decline”
(116). Stevenson’s novella is ostensibly centered on the mysterious figure of Edward
Hyde. What if, instead, the focus is on the other characters in the tale? What if Hyde
himself is merely a vehicle, not just for Jekyll’s duplicitous nighttime excursions, but for
all the men in the novel—and, vicariously, the reader as well? Just who is Hyde anyway?
All who are confronted with Hyde notice something not right with him but they
are unable to explain just what this is. When the reader is first introduced to Mr. Hyde, it
is through Mr. Enfield, “the well-known man about town” (8) who reports to Utterson his
interaction with Hyde while the former was “coming home from some place at the end of
the world, about three o’clock of a black winter morning” (9). Just what Enfield is doing
at such an ungodly hour, and just where he is coming from, is not questioned or
discussed. Utterson, with his “approved tolerance for others” (7), especially does not
enquire. The reader is only left to infer that, wherever Enfield has just come from, and
whatever he had been doing, has not been “clean.” In any case, the focus is on Hyde.
Upon being asked about Hyde’s appearance, Enfield replies,
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There is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something
downright detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarce know why.
He must be deformed somewhere; he gives a strong feeling of deformity,
although I couldn’t specify the point. He’s an extraordinary looking man, and yet
I really can name nothing out of the way. No, sir; can make no hand of it; I can’t
describe him. And it’s not want of memory; for I declare I can see him at this
moment. (11) (Italics mine)
Enfield’s inability to describe Hyde’s strange unpleasantness is mirrored by all others
who come into contact with him. When Utterson, who instantly attaches himself to the
Hyde character by naming himself “Mr. Seek” to “Mr. Hyde” (15), finally tracks down
the culprit, he experiences a similar unexplainable revulsion. He notes that “Mr.
Hyde…gave an impression of deformity without any nameable malformation” (17). Like
Enfield, Utterson can draw up a mental picture of Hyde, can explain his individual
features, and yet “not all of these together could explain the hitherto unknown disgust,
loathing and fear with which Mr. Utterson regarded him,” only that “the man seems
hardly human! Something troglodytic” (17). Further in the novella, Hyde is described as
having a “haunting sense of unexpressed deformity” (24), “something queer about
[him]—something that gave a man a turn” (37), and “something abnormal and
misbegotten in the very essence” of him, “something seizing, surprising and revolting”
(45). The word choice may vary slightly but all men who come into contact with Hyde
are unanimous in their disapproval of his appearance, though, to a man, they are unable to
explain just what it is that is so displeasing. Not insignificantly, the one female who
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reports of seeing Hyde has a less striking impression. When overlooking the murder of
Sir Danvers Carew, the maid servant reports only that she “was surprised to recognize in
him a certain Mr. Hyde, who had once visited her master and for whom she had
conceived a dislike” (21). Other than recognizing Hyde, whom she had met previously,
she “paid less attention” to him than to Carew, whom she notes was “an aged and
beautiful gentleman” whose face “seemed to breathe such an innocent and old-world
kindness of disposition, yet with something high too, as of a well-founded self-content”
(21). Hyde’s significance is overlooked by the servant until he begins to assault Carew.
Men in the story appear to have a much stronger reaction to seeing Hyde than women do.
The reason for this lies less in Hyde himself than in what he represents to the men who
witness him.
Peter K. Garrett, noting this phenomenon, suggests that, for men, “Hyde
remains…faceless…a blank to be filled in by each interpreter who encounters him. His
significance depends less on some pure essence within him than on the purifying effect of
considering him wholly other” which results in “the flattering effect of considering hatred
for him a confirmation of ‘nobler’ human instincts” (65). In abjecting Hyde, who is a
representative of the baser, more animalistic side of man, his “interpreters” thus project
on to him the baser sides of themselves, which they wish to keep submerged. Hyde, it
seems, is largely a scapegoat for the sins of the men themselves. Garrett continues his
observation: “[l]ike Jekyll, several of the other characters try to dissociate themselves
from Hyde, but the ‘instinctive’ repulsion they feel toward him also binds them to him”
(67) as, mirror-like, “[t]hose who confront and oppose Hyde seem to turn into his
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doubles” (68). By creating Hyde and letting him loose into society, Jekyll wishes to
compartmentalize the side of himself that is unacceptable to society while still keeping
his own person and reputation intact. Unwittingly, he instead unleashes a figure of
lawlessness that produces an “effect of contamination” on multiple fronts (Garrett 68).
Jekyll and Hyde ostensibly unfolds in a world of law and order. Mr. Utterson, the
pragmatic lawyer, is the primary recipient of all documents relating to Mr. Hyde’s
deeds—all wills, statements, and incidents find their way back to Utterson who, because
of his profession, is the one responsible for determining how each new item of
information should be dealt with. As previous critics have pointed out, he is the “utterson” in the story, both in terms of “utterly a son” beholden to the Law (of the Father), and
as the one who “utters” the law. Nevertheless, we are told, he is not one to judge his
peers, since he “had an approved tolerance for others; sometimes wondering, almost with
envy, at the high pressure of spirits involved in their misdeeds” (7). He seems to have
been acquainted with several “down-going men” of his own class, and never been one to
reprove. His sense of order, however, is never perturbed, as “his friends were those of his
own blood or those he had known the longest” (7). In other words, his attention is
reserved for his social peers. His “tolerance” for others smacks of vicarious pleasure in
their iniquities. He may represent the law but, for his own, the law is applied selectively.
Laws may be bent or broken, but as long as the iniquitous find themselves in good social
standing then the order of society is still intact. That social order, one of economic,
gender, and class consciousness, is the only order to be upheld. It is also the order that,
most damagingly, Hyde is guilty of threatening. These men are not so much beholden to
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the law as they are the law. Through dinners, meetings, and documents, we are constantly
reminded that Jekyll and his professional cohort reinforce each other’s professional,
bourgeois respectability. They are, we are reminded, “all intelligent, reputable men and
all judges of good wine” (19). Security in their social respectability is dependent on their
collective ability to uphold each other’s reputations. Hyde is the negation of all that, and
it is for this reason that he appears so threatening to the men. It is not sin and lawlessness
itself that makes Hyde so dangerous to those acquainted with him, it is his connection to
both respectability (through Jekyll’s wealth) and the lower end of the social order that
gives Utterson such pause. In a social organization based on clear class divisions, there
exists a comfortable order wherein even servants know their place. Poole, Jekyll’s long
suffering servant, enacts an awareness and acceptance of class divisions and
responsibilities. Hyde, in contrast, transgresses accepted social divisions, and threatens
the stability of the order.
In order to find further evidence of these assertions, we should take a close look at
Hyde’s specific crimes and punishments. Remember that, as readers, our first encounter
with Hyde is through Enfield, Utterson’s dubiously moral kin and companion. Enfield,
we remember, is heading home at an ungodly hour when he witnesses Hyde come into
contact with a young “girl of maybe eight or ten” (9). To Enfield’s horror, “the two ran
into one another naturally enough at the corner; and then came the horrible part of the
thing; for the man trampled calmly over the child’s body and left her screaming on the
ground. It sounds nothing to hear [Enfield reports] but it was hellish to see” (9).
Disregarding Enfield’s strange comment that the trampling of a screaming child is
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“nothing to hear,” it is the subsequent reaction to the scene that reveals our witness’ true
motives. Enfield takes off after Hyde and physically returns him to the scene of the
crime. The true victim of the crime, the child, is determined to be “not much the worse,
more frightened…and there you might have supposed to be an end of it” (9). The men
involved, however, have other ideas, and they take the punishment into their own hands.
As Enfield recounts:
I had taken a loathing to my gentleman [Hyde] at first sight. So had the child’s
family, which was only natural. But the doctor’s case was what struck me…every
time he looked at my prisoner, I saw that Sawbones turn sick and white with the
desire to kill him. I knew what was in his mind, just as he knew what was in mine;
and killing being out of the question, we did the next best. We told the man we
could and would make such a scandal out of this, as should make his name stink
from one end of London to the other. If he had any friends or any credit, we
undertook that he should lose them. And all the time, as we were pitching it in red
hot, we were keeping the women off him as best we could, for they were as wild
as harpies. I never saw a circle of such hateful faces; and there was the man in the
middle, with a kind of black, sneering coolness…“If you choose to make capital
of this accident,’ said he, ‘I am naturally helpless. No gentleman but wishes to
avoid a scene,” says he. “Name your figure.” (9)
The injured child herself is quickly dismissed from the scene, becoming now merely a
catalyst for an economic transaction among men. The emotionless doctor, whom Enfield
refers to as “Sawbones,” becomes important in the scene not as an attendant to the
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trampled child, but as an agent of social and economic justice. Enfield and the doctor
become complicit in the ensuing economic retribution in contrast to the women in the
scene who are depicted as irrational, vengeful “harpies” (10). Furthermore, Hyde’s
freedom is not threatened; never are the police or the law called in during this incident. It
is Hyde’s name and credit that are at stake, and which the men in the scene use as
leverage against Hyde. The law is taken into the hands of laymen and a transaction
occurs. This transaction, which takes the form of agreed monetary payment for the
injured girl, exists outside the law, among civilians. Hyde is able to escape from legal
retribution and walk away a free man. This signals to Hyde, at least for a while, that his
transgressions can be bought and no true punishment will occur.
Although women appear in this scene, and it is a female child that is trampled,
women appear to be otherwise unimportant to the ensuing action. Even the father of the
child leaves the scene with the other men to pursue a monetary reimbursement, and it
quickly becomes a concern about patriarchal debt that rises to importance. Jarrold Hogle
even reads in the scene a bit of vicarious male pleasure, the men in the scene being
unwittingly complicit with Hyde’s trampling of the child. Hogle argues that it “shows
how Hyde serves the general need of Victorian men to beat down the child and woman in
themselves” (178). Hyde’s actions are vicious in the trampling over the child, but it is
something else in Hyde—his appearance, what the men see reflected in him—that causes
the worst harm to the men themselves. Hyde is one of them—able and man enough to
satisfy an arbitrary debt—but they are unable to face this truth. Hyde represents what
they wish not to see in themselves, and what they constantly, through abjection, must
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“thrust aside in order to live” (Kristeva 3). The girl’s body then becomes a familiar
commodity, and even in this instance, payment for the female body is what the men
revert to. It is what they understand. Furthermore, as Hogle reads it,
Hyde’s walking over the girl does violate Christian and secular laws, but this
movement of a quasi-phallic “Juggernaut”…this dragging of an erected,
masculine, once-hindu idol-figure over people (mainly women and children)
whose enthrallment reveals its power, is far less daunting to the men at the scene
than the way the girl might remind them of what they retain in their body
language. Hyde’s violence allows them to say next to nothing to or about the child
or her sex. It encourages them to marginalize her…To be a Juggernaut, it turns
out, is to challenge the Law of the Father with the behavior that the Law
continually encourages yet tries to dissociate from its public declarations. In
response, the power-seeking cruelty in that behavior starts to come out in the male
observers. (179)
If we accept this reading, then despite their reflexive “casting off” of Hyde, the men are
not so much offended by the child’s trampling—which they secretly are complicit in—as
by Hyde’s threat to the Law of the Father, which monetary repayment is presumably
meant to correct.
The murder of Sir Danvers Carew is, in at least one way, a mirrored reversal of
the earlier trampling scene. Here, the victim is not the child but the symbolic Father,
Member of Parliament, the ultimate patriarch and symbol of law and order. Sir Danvers
Carew—unlike the nameless girl in the earlier scene—is highly respected in society. His
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position signifies the law and order that Hyde’s creation is intended to subvert. Our
witness to the crime is a woman, a “maid servant living alone” who, as already noted, is
“romantically given” (21). The nameless maid servant and witness is described with
almost comically romantic innocence as one who “with streaming tears” had “never…felt
more at peace with all men or thought more kindly of the world” (21). Witnessing the
brutal and seemingly senseless murder of Carew causes her to faint for several hours
before she awakes and alerts the police. Danvers’ body is found “incredibly mangled” in
the street with his purse and gold watch still on him, as well as, ironically, a “sealed and
stamped envelope…which bore the name and address of Mr. Utterson” (22). What the
envelope contains remains unexplained. Nevertheless, Utterson is once again an
immediate player in the events surrounding Hyde.
Keeping in mind that the events which led to the murder of Carew are told
through the perspective of a single nameless maid, Hyde’s ferocious act seems to have
had little provocation. Unlike Hyde’s careless trampling of the child in the earlier scene,
which was cruel but seemingly unintentional, Hyde’s attack on Carew was deliberate. It
happens around eleven at night—late, but not ungodly so—when the two men approach
each other from opposite ends of the street. They meet just under the window where the
maid, presumably unnoticed, is dreamily gazing out upon the street, and an interaction
quickly devolves into an altercation. As they come close, the maid observes that “the
older man bowed and accosted the other with a very pretty manner of politeness. It did
not seem as if the subject of his address were of great importance; indeed, from his
pointing, it sometimes appeared as if he were only inquiring his way” (21). Whatever the
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reason for the interaction, innocent or not, Hyde responds viciously. As Carew speaks,
Hyde “answered never a word, and seemed to listen with an ill-contained impatience.
And all of a sudden he broke out in a great flame of anger, stamping with his foot,
brandishing the cane, and carrying on (as the maid described it) like a madman” (21). The
killing is brutal: the maid recalls “a storm of blows, under which the bones were audibly
shattered and the body jumped upon the roadway” (22). This is not just ordinary street
violence; this is a barrage.
By choosing as his singular witness to the attack a stereotypically romantic
woman, Stevenson is able to accomplish a few things. Reading the description of the
attack more closely, the reader can infer a different interpretation than the one the maid
imagines. Stevenson’s careful word choice indicates the maid is an unreliable witness.
Carew did not merely approach Hyde, he “accosted” him, a verb that implies aggression
or insistence rather than mere formality. The “pretty manner of politeness” the maid
observes, then, may either be projection on the maid’s part or indication of something a
bit more illicit. The maid presumes little importance in the interaction between the two
men, merely believing that Carew is “inquiring his way,” yet a close reading also
indicates a generous lapse of time in the qualifier “sometimes.” If he is “sometimes”
seeming to do something, then the interaction is taking longer than what is initially
described. Hyde listens with an “ill-contained impatience,” also implying that the
conversation is taking longer than a simple inquiry may suggest. A few critics, Veeder
among them, have pointed out the inconsistencies in this narrative. Veeder observes:
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Since every act is motivated, the apparent absence of provocation by Carew and
the patent excessiveness of Hyde’s reaction encourage us to look to the
unconscious. What we see is a dramatization of the son’s psyche, a playing out of
oedipal, patricidal fantasy. Though “madman” and “ape-like” are applied to
Hyde…these conventional explanations mask the true nature of a rage articulated
initially by “stamping with his foot”…This is a gesture of petulant immaturity. In
this context Carew’s exemplary nature marks him as the enemy whose slightest
provocation will set Hyde off. And provocations do appear amid Carew’s
politeness…The maid’s narrative, with its “sometimes,” “only,” and “but,”
suggests that something more than “inquiring his way” must have occurred. (127)
Veeder reads a literal and figurative “oedipal triangle” occurring in this scene. The two
men, meeting at the bottom, form the base of a triangle with our silent witness marking
out the apex (Veeder 128). Although she is witnessing a savage crime happening before
her eyes, the maid does not call for help. Rather, she quietly observes Carew’s bones
audibly shattering and his helpless body jumping upon the sidewalk before fainting for
three hours. Only later, when she revives, does she call for help. This reveals a perhaps
unintentional complicity on the maid’s part. “We can therefore,” Veeder concludes,
“view her conduct in terms of the son’s wish fulfillment. Silence implies consent. Mother
does not cry out because she is captivated by the son’s puissant attack on the weak
father” (128). Veeder also connects the maid’s fainting with the “’little death’ of orgasm,
[that] attests to the son’s adequacy as replacement for the father” (128). Furthermore, the
weapon used in the murder, Hyde’s phallic cane, splits in two under the force of the act.
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Whatever the direct reasoning behind Hyde’s killing of the “Father,” Carew, the
action causes Hyde to disappear. Hyde is now a fugitive for whom “thousands of pounds
were offered in reward, for the death of Sir Danvers was resented as a public injury” (28).
Nevertheless, no amount of monetary payment will truly absolve him of this act in the
way that the trampling of the child was absolved. The day following the murder, Utterson
re-enters the scene and becomes central to the investigation. In fact, it is Utterson, the
utter-son, who arrives at the police station and identifies the body as belonging to Carew.
Once again, in the clear light of day, away from the criminal and sexual implications of
the night, the men return to their professional and financial interests. Upon confirmation
of the patriarchal importance of the victim, the “eye” of the officer in charge “lighted up
with professional ambition” (22). The Father will be avenged, and the son, who in this
instance carries out the law of the Father, will rise in prominence. Utterson also
recognizes the murder weapon, the broken stick that “he had himself presented many
years before to Henry Jekyll” (22). The stick appears to provide proof that Hyde is indeed
the murderer, but it also implicates Jekyll and, by association, Utterson himself. Utterson
does not outright reveal this knowledge to the officer, likely protecting himself and Jekyll
from any direct connection to the murder. He does, however, reveal his knowledge of
Hyde’s lodgings, inviting himself along in the law’s search for the culprit.
As Utterson and the officer ride through the foggy streets of the “dismal quarter of
Soho…with its muddy ways, and slatternly passengers” (23), Utterson’s conscience is not
entirely clear, for “[t]he thoughts of his mind…were of the gloomiest dye; and when he
glanced at the companion of his drive, he was conscious of some touch of that terror of
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the law and the law’s officers, which may at times assail the most honest” (23). We
know, however, that Utterson, despite his ostensible honesty and devotion to the law, is
himself not immune to turning a blind eye, particularly when it involves himself and his
social companions, who must be protected for the sake of propriety and continuation of
the social order. Hyde, as one who exists on the fringes of this patriarchal order and
society, provides a scapegoat for all the iniquities of Jekyll, Utterson, and those of their
social class. Although at this point we know he has an intimate, though unexplained,
connection to the reputable Jekyll, Hyde is forever outside the order of respectability.
Although we know that Hyde has money, or access to Jekyll’s money, he himself remains
lodged in the seedier side of town. The scenery surrounding Hyde’s lodgings provides a
contrast to the bourgeois world of the patriarchs, and as Utterson and the officer arrive,
the contrast is noted:
As the cab drew up before the address indicated, the fog lifted a little and showed
him a dingy street, a gin palace, a low French eating house, a shop for the retail of
penny numbers and twopenny salads, many ragged children huddled in the
doorways, and many women of many different nationalities passing out, key in
hand, to have a morning glass; and the next moment the fog settled down again
upon that part, as brown as umber, and cut him off from his blackguardly
surroundings. This was the home of Henry Jekyll’s favourite; of a man who was
heir to quarter of a million sterling. (23)
Utterson is clearly discomfited by what, to him, “seemed…like a district of some city in a
nightmare” (23). This is Utterson’s London, but it is not the London Utterson recognizes,
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or wishes to recognize. This area of town: cheap, sooty, dark, and full of downtrodden
people, represents the side of England and English society that, although close in
distance, is far from the daily reality Utterson wishes to acknowledge. As Valdine
Clemens notes:
Hyde belongs to the “night side” of London life with which many Victorian men
were actually quite familiar. However monstrous he may seem, he is the shadow
self not only of Jekyll, but of Victorian society in general. As the inferior double
who embodies and exposes this society’s moral deficiencies, Hyde triggers the
“awareness of guilt” that Otto Rank describes as “measur[ing]…the distance
between the ego-ideal and the attained reality” (76). Jekyll, whose repressed
sexuality erupts in sadism and brutality and ends in his own self-destruction,
epitomizes a collective sense of guilt and concomitant anxiety about the
“reinvasion of darkness” into the comfortable, privileged lives of the ascendant
professional and merchant classes of English society. (129)
This sustained hypocrisy is something Utterson is undoubtedly aware of, and which gives
him so much anxiety. It is also what causes him to believe the circumstances uniting
Jekyll and Hyde could only be nefarious. The seedier side of London life is one thing that
gave late Victorian society trouble—for how can such a superior, wealthy, imperial
society give rise to such squalor within its own borders?—but even more troubling is the
connection between this life and the world of respectable professionals. The figure of
Hyde unites these two seemingly alternate yet deeply intertwined realities. It is not
merely that Hyde is himself of a lower order that must be abjected; it is Hyde’s obvious
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personal and financial connection to Jekyll, and subsequently Jekyll’s social class, that
causes such anxiety. Hyde resides in Soho, but Hyde will not stay in Soho. Utterson does
not know at this point that Hyde is literally walking around in Jekyll’s shoes, but he does
sense that Hyde is usurping Jekyll’s position, pretending to respectability—a social sin
that Utterson instinctively rejects. Saposnik notes that:
The universal hatred directed at Hyde both in and out of the story is a striking
verification of the extent to which Victorian England feared what he
represented…Victorian anxieties contributed greatly to Jekyll and Hyde’s success.
The fictional paradox revealed the social paradox; Jekyll’s dilemma spoke for
more of his countrymen than many were willing to admit. (116)
The mere knowledge of Hyde’s existence has, until now, haunted Utterson’s
waking thoughts and nightly dreams. As time passes following the murder, however, and
the threat of Hyde’s presence daily fades, Utterson’s fears begin to subside, and he
considers the “death of Sir Danvers…more than paid for by the disappearance of Mr.
Hyde” (28). Even death, it seems, can be considered a fair exchange.
III. In the Agonized Womb of Consciousness
Hyde was born in a transformed laboratory that was once used as an anatomical
theater. Dr. Jekyll “had bought the house from the heirs of a celebrated surgeon; and his
own tastes being rather chemical than anatomical, had changed the destination” (25). The
original purpose, however, seems fitting, as this is the place where Jekyll, reminiscent of
his literary predecessor Dr. Frankenstein, creates the creature that is Hyde. Hogle remarks
that “Jekyll, withdrawing into a decayed anatomical theater in order to replace an old
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form of science with a new one, recalls many a gothic hero who hopes to construct a
unified sense of self in an antiquated location apparently removed from the vagaries of
rapid economic change” (167). Both conveniently and symbolically, the laboratory has
two entrances: the front entrance, accessible through the house, is where Jekyll, his
servants, and his companions enter the lab. The back entrance is utilized by Hyde, and it
is through this entrance that Enfield, and later Utterson, first notice Hyde entering and
leaving. As back entrances are commonly seen as being used by the lower classes or for
the purpose of shady business transactions, Hyde’s use of this door is fitting. Within the
lab itself, “a flight of stairs mounted to a door covered with red baize” leading to the
cabinet, a “large room, fitted round with glass presses, furnished, among other things,
with a cheval-glass and a business table, and looking out upon the court by three dusty
windows barred with iron” (25). It is a room within a room, appearing at once both
prison-like and domestic. It is here, in this womb-like retreat, that Jekyll first gave “birth”
to Hyde and where, eventually, they are destroyed.
Mr. Utterson, and through him the reader, first gains entrance into this mysterious
place immediately following the murder of Sir Danvers Carew. He is shown in by Poole,
Jekyll’s faithfully suffering servant, and encounters a sickly looking Jekyll. Jekyll, of
course, knows of the murder, though he claims knowledge only through the news being
shouted outside the house. Utterson wastes no time in questioning his boyhood
companion. His main fear, it appears, is that Jekyll is helping “hide Hyde,” and he fears
further scandal: “If it came to a trial,” Utterson warns, “your name might appear” (26).
The threat of social ruin is never far from Utterson’s thoughts. Jekyll assures him: “I
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cannot say that I care what becomes of Hyde; I am quite done with him. I was thinking of
my own character, which this hateful business has rather exposed” (26) (italics mine).
Utterson is surprised and relieved at Hyde’s apparent selfishness, yet he does not entirely
understand the depth of Jekyll’s statement. Utterson, is still thinking about Jekyll’s
reputation, and certainly Jekyll is as well, but for Jekyll, the character this business has
exposed runs deeper than mere reputation. It has revealed to Jekyll far more about his
own inner character and being that, along with the threat of public exposure, causes
Jekyll such remorse. “I have had a lesson,” he says as Utterson begins to leave, “Oh God,
Utterson, what a lesson I have had” (26)! It is a lesson that is learned too late. Jekyll may
hope to be rid of Hyde, but his transformation into Hyde is one that cannot be undone; he
has always, in a way, been Hyde, the complete physical and mental transformation being
merely its visual manifestation. What the Jekyll/Hyde body must now endure is physical
and emotional abjection—its ultimate signifier being death. We encounter Jekyll, again
through Utterson, only one last time. This time Utterson and his kinsman Enfield are
passing by the courtyard which Jekyll’s laboratory cabinet looks out upon. Jekyll is
seated in his cabinet “like some disconsolate prisoner” (32), the barred windows a
physical representation of the mental prison Jekyll is now reduced to. Jekyll has now
isolated himself, but he still desires companionship and agrees, with a smile, to chat
through the window until
the smile was struck out of his face and succeeded by an expression of such abject
terror and despair, as froze the very blood of the two gentlemen below. They saw
it but for a glimpse, for the window was instantly thrust down; but that glimpse
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had been sufficient, and they turned and left the court without a word. In silence,
too, they traversed the by-street; and it was not until they had come into a
neighbouring thoroughfare, where even upon a Sunday there were still some
stirrings of life, that Mr. Utterson at last turned and looked at his companion.
They were both pale; and there was an answering horror in their eyes. (32)
(Italics mine)
It is only when they are back on the street, in the midst of society, that Utterson is able to
utter the words: “God forgive us, God forgive us” (32). One wonders what Utterson
thinks they should be forgiven for. It appears he feels complicit in some sort of
transgression, or he is partly guilty of whatever has caused Jekyll such abject despair.
Jekyll’s sins are his own, but they are shared, in some way, by his companions.
Utterson’s own guilt is unexplained, but it is sure that he, in some way, shares the sins of
his peers. The “answering horror,” also, hints at some secret knowledge of whatever has
caused Jekyll’s downfall.
As a narrative, Jekyll and Hyde leaves out as much as it includes. Told from
various points of view and by various narrative voices—Utterson, Enfield, Lanyon, the
nameless maid servant, and Jekyll—the reader must remember that each narration is only
part of a whole. Even Jekyll’s own “Full Statement of the Case,” which purports to
explain, once and for all, the mystery of Jekyll and Hyde, is told by a man who is at the
limit of his own abjection, and unable to fully be honest with himself. As Ronald R.
Thomas notes, the narrative “recounts the estrangement of a speaker from his own voice
and a writer from what he has written…The act of self-narration is revealed in Jekyll and
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Hyde to be a ritual act of self-estrangement rather than the act of self-discovery that it
purports to be,” so that “[t]he end of Jekyll and Hyde is the fragmenting of the self into
distinct pieces with distinct voices, not the bringing together of those pieces into some
unified character who speaks with a single voice” (73). Jekyll himself, while trying to
explain his own division within himself, becomes unable to fully articulate who is doing
the speaking, and who is doing the acting—who, when all is said and done, is responsible
for it all. Before he has even given birth to the physical representation of Hyde—
childbirth being the chosen metaphor, if not the actual physical process that Hogle
references, and which I adopt—Jekyll admits that he “stood already committed to a
profound duplicity of life” (48). Hyde already existed, fully formed, within Jekyll, and
was not a separate being produced solely through Jekyll’s transforming potion. Jekyll
insists he “was in no sense a hypocrite; both sides of me were in dead earnest; I was no
more myself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than when I labored, in the
eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or the relief of sorrow and suffering” (28).
This duplicity, however, causes Jekyll great unhappiness until, though his metaphysical
research, he begins to work out the possible “separation of these elements” (49). Jekyll
dreams of a complete separation of his disparate parts, a separation so clean that “the just
could walk steadfastly and securely on his upward path…no longer exposed to disgrace
and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil” (49). Believing the evil side of him to
be “extraneous,” or at least in a position to become extraneous, Jekyll is already showing
himself to not be fully self-aware. In creating Hyde, Jekyll is just as guilty of every sin
Hyde commits as Hyde himself is—if the two can truly be separated. Nevertheless, Jekyll
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laments that “[i]t was the curse of mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus
bound together—that in the agonized womb of consciousness, these polar twins should
be continually struggling. How, then, were they dissociated” (49)? It is through a
chemical compound that “the trembling immateriality, the mist-like transience, of this
seemingly so solid body in which we walk attired” could be thrust off, and a new form
adopted (49). The very “fortress of identity” (50), which housed the singular and
respectable Jekyll, could now be altered and become the reprehensible Hyde.
The body of Jekyll contains two persons—the figure and person who is moral and
respectable, and the secretly sinning Hyde. Hyde contains only one person, one concern:
the cruel, sensuous, and villainous Hyde. All men are made of such “incongruous
faggots” consisting of good and evil, which causes our complex moral struggles and
which form the basis of abjection. Yet “Edward Hyde, alone in the ranks of mankind, was
pure evil” (51). Jekyll makes some attempt at explaining the physical manifestation of
Hyde. We remember that all who encounter Hyde, particularly the male representatives
of the patriarchal order, are repulsed by some unexplainable deformity in Hyde’s person.
None can quite articulate it but all are struck by it. A sociological look at Stevenson’s
description of Hyde, however, makes much more sense when viewed through the
Darwinian and anthropological discourse of his time. Hyde is seen as smaller in stature,
which Jekyll attributes to his taking up the smaller portion of his (Jekyll’s) personality.
However, various descriptions of Hyde also have clear racial and animalistic features as
well. In his “Statement,” Jekyll recalls an unwilling transformation into Hyde overnight
and waking to notice his change. Directly addressing Utterson, Jekyll recalls:
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In one of my more wakeful moments, my eye fell upon my hand. Now the hand of
Henry Jekyll (as you have often remarked) was professional in shape and size: it
was large, firm, white and comely. But the hand which I now saw, clearly enough,
in the yellow light of a mid-London morning, lying half shut on the bed clothes,
was lean, corded, knuckly, of a dusky pallor and thickly shaded with a swart
growth of hair. It was the hand of Edward Hyde. (54)
Later, Jekyll describes an unconscious transformation into Hyde where again he describes
his hand as being “corded and hairy” (58). The smallness, dusky pallor, and hairiness
would all signal to Stevenson’s contemporary readers racial as well as bestial differences.
Judith Halberstam notes that “Hyde, as the dark side of Jekyll, functions within the novel
as a stereotype of otherness. In other words, he embodies the traits of the ugly and the
undesirable and makes those traits essential signifiers of evil.” Citing Homi Bhabha,
Halberstam argues that “[t]he stereotype…both fixes the other within racist discourse and
recognizes the other as a danger and threat to all notions of origination and racial purity.
The ambivalent aspect of the stereotype is, then, a function of the possible simultaneity of
fear and desire within representations of otherness” (80). Further descriptions of Hyde
note his bestial nature and connection to animals, which range through (but are not
limited to) having an “ape-like fury” (22), who “cr[ies] out like a rat” (36), is “masked
like a monkey” (37), gives out a “dismal screech, as of mere animal terror” (38), and has,
according to Jekyll himself, “apelike spite” (62). Cyndy Hendershot reads this as Jekyll’s
“[attempt] to reify the animal as Hyde and hence purify the human Jekyll of his
association with the animal world” (105). Furthermore, “Hyde’s uncanniness is produced
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by the fact that the blending of animal and man in him is an imperceptible one. As a
cultural mirror for those he encounters, he indicates to them that the human and the
animal cannot be compartmentalized into binary oppositions” (109). This reflects
Kristeva’s theory that “[t]he abject confronts us…with those fragile states where man
strays on the territories of animal. Thus, by way of abjection, primitive societies have
marked out a precise area of their culture in order to remove it from the threatening world
of animals or animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and murder”
(12). Hyde’s animal nature allows those who encounter him to abject him as not wholly
human or civilized, but it also threatens the clear distinction between the human and the
animal that provides a comfort to civilized society. It also provides an uncanniness that,
for Victorian readers, may still have had a sense of shocking novelty. Valdine Clemens
observes that, while all who encounter Hyde are repulsed by him, “Darwin records that
people tend to feel similarly about apes…For the Victorian observer unused to seeing
such animals, it would more likely be the unsettling combination of difference and
similarity that would be frightful; it might be a bit like looking at oneself in a fun-house
mirror” (140). Hyde, then, resembles something both familiar and repulsively different.
His viewers can recognize him as nominally human, but are driven to abject that side of
him that reminds them of their own animal natures.
Hyde is also feminized, as Poole reports hearing him “[w]eeping like a woman or
a lost soul” (38), and when Dr. Lanyon reports of him that “he was wrestling against the
approaches of the hysteria” (45), a distinctly feminine affliction. However, it is Jekyll
who provides the true maternal body in the tale, as he endures the original gestation and
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preforms the first “birth” of the smaller, dependent, and child-like Hyde. Describing his
first transformation, Jekyll recalls
the most racking pangs succeeded: a grinding in the bones, deadly nausea, and a
horror of the spirit that cannot be exceeded at the hour of birth or death. Then
these agonies began swiftly to subside, and I came to myself as if out of a great
sickness. There was something strange in my sensations, something indescribably
new and, from its very novelty, incredibly sweet. I felt younger, lighter, happier in
body…I knew myself, at the first breath of this new life, to be more wicked,
tenfold more wicked, sold a slave to my original evil; and the thought, in that
moment, braced and delighted me like wine. I stretched out my hands, exulting in
the freshness of these sensations; and in the act, I was suddenly aware that I had
lost in stature. (50)
The “racking pangs” of Jekyll’s transformation are reminiscent of childbirth, and
we must recall Kristeva’s insistence that abjection “preserves what existed in the
archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the memorial violence with which a body
becomes separated from another body in order to be” (10). Furthermore, according to
Kristeva, “I experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and stead of what
will be ‘me.’ Not at all an other with whom I identify and incorporate, but an Other who
precedes and possesses me, and through such possession causes me to be” (10). Hogle
makes the connection between the Jekyll/Hyde transformation and the “casting off” of
childbirth (177). And it is Jekyll himself who states that “from these agonies of death and
birth” he has produced the fiend that is Hyde. Hyde, in turn, is the destroyer of Sir Carew
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as the representative “Father,” and, ultimately, of Jekyll. Speaking of his two aspects in
the third person, as Jekyll often does, Jekyll recalls of their relationship that “Jekyll had
more than a father’s interest; Hyde had more than a son’s indifference” (55). It is,
however, more than indifference on Hyde’s part as a resentful Hyde destroys a portrait of
Jekyll’s own father, another instance of petulant rage against the paternal. Jekyll comes to
believe that “had it not been for his fear of death, he would long ago have ruined himself
in order to involve me in the ruin” (61). At the end, the two are “knit…closer than a wife”
(61), and, no longer able to live with each other, must now only die together.
In the end, Jekyll fears—with reason—that his own identity, if such exists, is to
be swallowed up entirely by Hyde. He can no longer control his transformations, and the
powders which with he used to create his transforming potion cannot be found again, as
Jekyll begins to realize the “first supply was impure, and that it was that unknown
impurity which lent efficacy to the draught” (61). How ironic for Jekyll that the very
ingredient that caused his original transformation was itself a tainted amount. At the very
end, Utterson and Poole break in on Jekyll/Hyde in the laboratory cabinet and observe a
scene of relative peace:
There lay the cabinet before their eyes in the quiet lamplight, a good fire glowing
and chattering on the hearth, the kettle singing its thin strain, a drawer or two
open, papers neatly set forth on the business table, and nearer the fire, the things
laid out for tea: the quietest room, you would have said, and but for the glazed
presses full of chemicals, the most commonplace that night in London. (39)
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The scene would actually appear to be quite domestic if it weren’t for the smell of
kernels, which hints at cyanide, and the “body of a self-destroyer” (39) that lay on the
floor. Jekyll has performed the ultimate act of abjection—against the self, and against the
double, who is the self multiplied. It is both murder and suicide, and yet it is also Jekyll’s
only way out of “the horror of being Hyde” (59). In a way, it is the only form of
redemption left available to Jekyll. On the verge of discovering the truth about
Jekyll/Hyde—that they are one and the same—Utterson has one remaining hope for
Jekyll: that “we may at least save his credit” (41). For Jekyll may or may not be truly
gone at this point, but Utterson may at least preserve his good name, which Utterson
himself is personally invested in. In a brief moment of significance, Utterson and Poole
“came to the cheval glass” before which the Jekyll/Hyde personae saw so many
transformations, and “into whose depths they looked with an involuntary horror. But it
was so turned as to show them nothing but the rosy glow playing on the roof, the fire
sparkling in a hundred repetitions along the glazed front of the presses, and their own
pale and fearful countenances stooping to look in” (40). What they feared to see reflected
in the glass is anybody’s guess: perhaps it was the truth of their own abject faces peering
back at them.
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“STRANGE IDOLATRY”: OSCAR WILDE’S THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY

“Yet each man kills the thing he loves” Oscar Wilde, “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”
I. The Critic as Novelist
It would arguably be difficult to name a book as self-conscious and reflective of
its own time and author as The Picture of Dorian Gray. Perhaps more than any other
work examined in this current study, Dorian Gray encapsulates the spirit of its era and
the personality of its creator to the extent that many readers, and even critics, find
difficulty separating the characters in the novel from the charismatic figure of Oscar
Wilde himself. In an 1894 letter, Wilde wrote of the novel’s main characters: “Basil
Hallward is what I think I am: Lord Henry what the world thinks me: Dorian what I
would like to be—in some other ages, perhaps” (Letters 352). For the modern reader, the
history of Wilde’s own later trials, prison sentence, and exile make the tale of Dorian
Gray’s slide into abjection even more poignant, and the connection between creator and
creation more inextricably bound. It is almost as if Vivian’s statement in “The Decay of
Lying,” that “Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life,” was as prophetic as it was
subversive. (Intentions 307).
To a modern reader, the crime(s) of Oscar Wilde, of obscenity and “the Love that
dare not speak its name,” would likely not be seen as crimes at all. Indeed, to many
readers, Wilde is somewhat of a social martyr, a victim of the hypocrisies of the
Victorian era, which demanded public morality and attempted to turn a blind eye to the
failings of its own society. For this, history has largely forgiven Oscar Wilde, whose own
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fate—unlike that of Dorian Gray—was advertised in public as a warning against those
who may attempt similar transgressions. Victorian society was all too willing to lay its
own sins upon Wilde, a punishment for Wilde’s own audacity in calling out such
hypocrisies in the first place. Or, as biographer Richard Ellmann described it, Wilde
“reached for the main implication of his disgrace through a double negative; though men
thought he was unlike them, he was not. He was a genuine scapegoat” (103). Both
Wilde’s contemporaries and later critics have wondered at Wilde’s “rush to social
destruction,” as Harold Bloom termed it (5); his sense that he “was a martyr in his own
eyes” (Yeats 12); or even his “Christ-like affinities,” (Knight 39) in which “because there
is an exhibitionist compulsion on such men [as Wilde] to reveal themselves, Wilde could
not remain content with his social mask” (Knight 40). As for those “Christ-like
affinities”, which can be seen in Wilde’s own more personal writings, G. Wilson Knight
writes, somewhat histrionically but not entirely untruthfully, that “it remains a
martyrdom, a crucifixion, a self-exhibition in agony and shame. The shame may be of the
essence; at the least it shatters all the pseudo-dignities and masks of our lying
civilization” (41).
In that vein, it can be argued that Wilde was above all a critic (Bloom 1). His
subjects were many and included critical essays about art, theater, and the proclivities of
his own society. Dorian Gray is his only novel, and many have argued that it is not a
particularly great one. Jeff Nunokawa even explicitly lays it out: “Let’s face it,” he
writes, “the book is boring” (357). That boredom, for Nunokawa, is representative of the
ennui that represented so much of fin de siècle decadence as a movement and a
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philosophy. The common view is that Dorian Gray is itself a work of criticism in novel
form: much like Pater’s Marius the Epicurean written not a decade earlier espoused
Pater’s philosophy of self-discovery, Wilde’s novel is a vehicle for Wilde’s own
philosophy of life and its relation to art. For Wilde, however, adherence to a life of
hedonism—the New Hedonism, as Henry Wotton terms it—leads to an emptiness and
paranoia that can only result in self-destruction. Though rumors abound regarding Dorian
Gray’s secret vices—the nature of which are only alluded to in the novel—Dorian is
literally able to save face, at least for a time. When Basil Hallward visits Dorian and
expresses dismay and a warning at “the most dreadful things…being said against you in
London,” he is incredulous that Dorian could actually be guilty: “Mind you,” Basil tells
Dorian, “I don’t believe these rumours at all. At least I can’t believe them when I see you.
Sin is a thing that writes itself across a man’s face. It cannot be concealed” (126).
Dorian’s secret, of course, is that his sins are reflected in his appearance—just not the
flesh and blood version. Like the homosexuality that Wilde and his companions were
forced to keep in secret, Dorian is forced to hide his portrait—his double and the
manifestation of his own sins—in secret, behind a locked door and a shroud. The
difference, however, is that while Dorian’s lack of a personality of his own causes him to
become cruel and immoral, Wilde was, I would argue, intensely moral—just not in the
superficial way society demanded. As noted earlier, abjection is always defined and
delineated by the constructs of an individual society. For late-Victorian Britain, public
morality was fiercely guarded, while private “transgressions” of social mores were meant
to be kept hidden.
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As a man of his time—Dandy, Aesthete, decadent, and wit—Oscar Wilde was
infatuated with artifice. Like many of his social contemporaries in the world of art,
letters, and theater, Wilde was influenced by Walter Pater, the pater, or father, of the
movement toward “Art for Art’s sake.” The term, originating in the French by Gautier,
was adapted and anglicized by Pater and served as a sort of credo by the Aesthetic
movement. Ironically, it is Pater’s “Conclusion” to The Renaissance—deemed so
incendiary that Pater himself excluded it from the second edition—that Dorian follows
with such blind adherence, and such fatal consequence. Pater’s insistence that “[n]ot the
fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end,” and his injunction that “[t]o burn
always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life” (334), is
echoed in Lord Henry’s advice to Dorian that
[t]he aim of life is self-development. To realize one’s nature perfectly—that is
what each of us is here for…I believe that if one man were to live out his life fully
and completely, were to give form to every feeling, expression to every thought,
reality to every dream—I believe that the world would gain such a fresh impulse
of joy that we would forget all the maladies of mediaevalism, and return to the
Hellenic ideal. (19)
In response to this, Dorian, ever impressionable, finds that “[l]ife suddenly became fierycoloured to him. It seemed to him that he had been walking in fire” (20). Dorian, with the
most Hellenic of names, follows this advice to the letter. Yet, strangely, it is not selfdiscovery that Dorian finds, but self- destruction; not lifelong joy and inspiration, but an
ever-increasing misery and paranoia. Harold Bloom finds a correspondence in Wilde’s
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own life, reflecting that “Pater, and not Lord Alfred Douglas, was Wilde’s disaster” (3).
Just as Dorian Gray “could not free himself from the influence” (105) of the mysterious
“poisonous book” (104) sent to him by Lord Wotton, the young Wilde was influenced at
a young age by Pater’s writings. The call to live life to the fullest extent was arguably
partly responsible for Wilde’s reckless behavior, and the libel suit that ultimately caused
Wilde’s own abject fall from society.
Nils Clausson, in comparing Dorian to Pater’s Marius, finds that “the Gothic plot
of Dorian Gray is ultimately inconsistent with the Paterian plot of self-development, for
the twin themes of self-development and degeneration are antithetical, if not
contradictory, suggesting as they do positive and negative movements, respectively”
(343). Clausson, instead, places Dorian Gray firmly in the genre of late-Victorian Gothic,
alongside Stevenson’s Jekyll and Hyde, in which “degeneration from a higher to a lower
state” becomes the driving theme (343). Nor is Clausson the only one to compare Dorian
Gray to its immediate predecessor. In “The Decay of Lying,” Wilde himself makes more
than a brief reference to Stevenson’s novella, having Vivian relate a story of “a friend of
mine, called Mr. Hyde,” who found himself enacting the scene of the trampling over the
child in Stevenson’s novella (Impressions 309). It is, for Wilde’s Vivian, just one
example of life imitating art.
There is a limit, however, to how far I would take the comparison between Oscar
the writer and Dorian the character. Oscar Wilde may have, perhaps somewhat flippantly,
expressed a desire to be Dorian “in some other age,” but the author is not the creation.
The difference—apart from the fact that, at least to our knowledge, Oscar Wilde never
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murdered anyone—is a matter of self-awareness. While The Picture of Dorian Gray is a
novel that is nothing if not self-aware, its protagonist, the vain and impressionable
Dorian, shows a distinct lack of self-awareness that may be, even more than his cruel
narcissism, his tragic flaw.
II. “Behind Every Exquisite Thing…”
Just who is Dorian Gray, the titular character through and around whom such
tragedy occurs? If his companions are to be believed, Dorian possesses a singular and
magnetic personality. Before he even enters the novel, the reader is introduced to
Dorian’s character through the words of his admirer, the lovesick Basil, as he tells Lord
Henry Wotton that upon first laying eyes upon Dorian, “[a] curious sensation of terror
came over me. I knew that I had come face to face with some one whose mere personality
was so fascinating that, if I allowed it to do so, it would absorb my whole nature, my
whole soul, my very art itself” (10). A short while later, Basil further admits to Henry
that “[a]s long as I live, the personality of Dorian Gray will dominate me” (15). For his
part, Lord Henry also becomes intrigued although, unlike Basil, Henry’s attraction is less
homoerotic and more scientific. Psychology, at this time, may still be a burgeoning
science, but Henry is already a skilled practitioner. Henry, we are told, “had been always
enthralled by the methods of natural science, but the ordinary subject-matter of that
science had seemed to him trivial and of no import. And so he had begun by vivisecting
himself, as he had ended by vivisecting others. Human life—that appeared to him the one
thing worth investigating” (51). To Henry, whose power of influence is referenced
multiple times in the story, Dorian makes for a perfect subject, a specimen of study.
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People are taken in by the “exquisite” figure of Dorian Gray. His youth and
beauty, to say nothing of his genealogy and tragic parentage, provide a reason for his
attractiveness to society. Yet, when we look beyond the gushing tributes of his admirers,
Dorian’s own personality falls flat. From the beginning, Dorian appears naïve, eager to
please, and more than a little impressionable. Basil speaks of the singular “personality”
that drew him to Dorian, but one would not be wrong to suspect that Basil’s admiration
was more physical than intellectual. The truth, if we really look at Dorian’s own words
and deeds, is that Dorian himself possesses little personality of his own. He lacks selfawareness, is easily influenced and, perhaps the greatest sin of all, is actually quite
boring. He is beautiful, petulant, and self-centered, but he lacks ideas of his own. In just a
few minutes and a few words, Lord Henry’s influence paves the path for Dorian’s entire
future. In less than a single afternoon in Basil’s studio, Dorian becomes “dimly conscious
that entirely fresh influences were at work within him. Yet they seemed to him to have
really come from himself” (20). Dorian does not even recognize when he is being
manipulated. A few short months after their meeting, Henry reflects on his influence over
Dorian, and concedes that “to a large extent the lad was his own creation. He had made
him premature” (51). Lord Henry, we are told, finds “exquisite pleasure in playing on the
lad’s unconscious egotism” (84). And even Dorian, in an early scene, admits to Lord
Henry, “I do everything that you say” (43). It is not long before Dorian’s own words
begin to echo Henry’s Wilde-like quips.
Like any good Dandy or Decadent, it is no surprise that Dorian gives in to fads
and brief fascination. But there is also a sense of tragedy in his story. Orphaned at a
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young age, Dorian is raised by his cold, “mean dog” of a grandfather (32). Upon hearing
Dorian’s history, Henry Wotton reflects that
it had yet stirred him by its suggestion of a strange, almost modern romance. A
beautiful woman risking everything for a mad passion. A few wild weeks of
happiness cut short by a hideous, treacherous crime. Months of voiceless agony,
and then a child born in pain. The mother snatched away by death, the boy left to
solitude and the tyranny of an old and loveless man. Yes; it was an interesting
background. It posed the lad, made him more perfect as it were. Behind every
exquisite thing that existed, there was something tragic. (34)
Lord Wotton views Dorian’s background as a tragic romance that only heightens his
interest in Dorian as a psychological study. For Wotton, it is the story and the romance
that surrounds Dorian as a work of art, molded in large part by Lord Wotton himself,
which is important. Basil Hallward may be the artist in the story, painting Dorian’s
portrait as he, Basil, sees Dorian, but Lord Wotton views himself as sculpting a work of
living art out of the flesh and blood Dorian. Lord Wotton sees himself as an early
psychologist, an observer of human behavior, but also as an influencer. Dorian’s family
history is romantic enough for a novel, and for Lord Wotton it is the perfect living story.
Furthermore, devoid as Dorian is of a solid family foundation or any intimate familial
connections, Dorian is the perfect vessel for outside influence. Dorian’s reactions toward
outward expressions of emotion by others reflect his indifference to the needs of others.
This indifference is the result of a lack of close relationships early in his life. We can see
the repercussions of this early emotional abandonment through Dorian’s brief infatuation
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with the idea of Sibyl Vane. Denied a maternal influence, Dorian has no referent for
feminine love. His only love object, Sibyl Vane symbolizes to him a shifting parade of
female characters; he idolizes her because to him she is not a real girl/woman. When
asked by Lord Wotton, “[w]hen is she Sibyl Vane?” Dorian replies, “Never” (49).
Conversely, Dorian is denied paternal guidance. Raised by his grandfather who, “had
always hated and desired to keep [Dorian] at a distance” (101), Dorian has no knowledge
of the Lacanian Law of the Father. Thus it is not surprising that Dorian’s love should turn
inward, toward narcissism.
“Abjection,” writes Kristeva, “is a precondition of narcissism” (13). Furthermore,
“[n]arcissism is predicated on the existence of the ego but not of an external object” (62).
If Dorian’s narcissism is based in his lack of early childhood affections (such as an
attachment to a mother), it is only intensified by the adoration he receives from others.
He seems naively unaware of the true nature and extent of Basil’s adoration of him, yet
becomes instantly enthralled with his own portrait: “[w]hen he saw it [the portrait] he
drew back, and his cheeks flushed for a moment with pleasure. A look of joy came into
his eyes, as if he had recognized himself for the first time…The sense of his own beauty
came on him like a revelation. He had never felt it before” (25). Basil loves Dorian but
Dorian is unable to return that love. It is only through Basil’s portrait that Dorian realizes
his true object of love: himself. The moment he sees it, the portrait becomes the object of
his affection, the “Other” of his desire. The portrait mirrors his own image, becoming that
reflection through which Dorian recognizes himself for the first time. This brings about
“the narcissistic crisis” that, Kristeva writes, “provides, along with its truth, a view of the
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abject” (15). Lord Henry, in a perhaps unwitting display of foreshadowing, acknowledges
this connection: “Why, my dear Basil, he [Dorian] is a Narcissus,” (7). Like Narcissus,
Dorian’s reflection becomes the cause of his own eventual self-destruction. However,
unlike Narcissus, Dorian’s portrait does not remain a mere reflection of the original; it
becomes a subject, and not a mere object. Both subject and object, the portrait stands in
an indefinable space. In this space, it becomes a symbol of the abject.
This fracturing of personalities occurs when Dorian, influenced by Henry’s words
and becoming aware of his own fleeting beauty, utters his fateful prayer:
How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will
remain always young. It will never be older than this particular day of June…If it
were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture
that was to grow old! For that—for that—I would give everything! Yes, there is
nothing in the whole world I would not give! I would give my soul for that! (25)
Dorian’s newfound belief, instilled in him by Lord Henry’s Mephistophelean influence,
that “[y]outh is the only thing worth having” (26), causes him to act irrationally. Basil is
horrified by this new behavior in his friend and love interest, and threatens to destroy the
portrait that, only a short time earlier, he considered his best work. When Dorian leaps up
to stop Basil, he pleads to the painter, exclaiming “[i]t would be murder!” (27). The
portrait becomes increasingly personified, not a mere image but a character of its own. As
Lord Henry and Dorian begin to leave for the theater, Basil becomes morose. “I shall stay
with the real Dorian,” he says (28). He does not know how true his words are.
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III. The Consciousness of Degradation
The first change in the portrait occurs when, rejected by the fickle and narcissistic
Dorian, Sibyl Vane kills herself. Yet before Dorian even notices this change in his
double, his view toward the world changes. As Dorian leaves the theater following his
final encounter with Sibyl—whose name, hearkening back to the Sibyls of ancient
Greece, is itself prophetic—Dorian’s rosy-colored view of the world becomes darkened:
He remembered wandering through dimly-lit streets, past gaunt black-shadowed
archways and evil-looking houses. Women with hoarse voices and harsh laughter
had called after him. Drunkards had reeled by cursing, and chattering to
themselves like monstrous apes. He had seen grotesque children huddled upon
door-steps, and heard shrieks and oaths from gloomy courts. (75)
The abject images before him are realities of London life, yet they are also reflections of
the abject occurring within Dorian himself. As morning comes, however, Dorian is given
a brief respite from the horrors of the night. The “beauty” of the flowers “seemed to bring
him an anodyne for his pain” (75). It is in this mood that Dorian returns home and notices
the portrait.
Dorian’s first action upon seeing the change in the portrait is symbolic. Noticing
the “touch of cruelty in the mouth” of the portrait, Dorian picks up “an oval glass framed
in ivory Cupids, one of Lord Henry’s many presents to him” and “glance[s] hurriedly into
its polished depths” (77). He looks from the mirrored image in the glass to the portrait
and realizes there is indeed a difference, however slight, in both reflections. In this scene
Dorian, the flesh and blood version, is staring into two identical yet altered reflections.
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The mirror serves as a go-between for both flesh Dorian and portrait Dorian. It is through
the mirror that Dorian begins to awake to the truth of the portrait as he remembers that
“[h]e had uttered a mad wish that he himself might remain young and the portrait grow
old; that his own beauty might be untarnished, and the face on the canvas bear the burden
of his passions and his sins” (77). The portrait offers Dorian a brief chance at redemption
as Dorian faces, literally, the consequence of his own crimes: “It [the portrait] had taught
him to love his own beauty. Would it teach him to loathe his own soul” (78)? Dorian
struggles with whether this change is reality or illusion. As Dorian and the portrait stare
at each other, Dorian feels “[a] sense of infinite pity, not for himself, but for the painted
image of himself,” and he realizes that “[t]he picture, changed or unchanged, would be to
him the visible emblem of conscience” (78).
Dorian struggles with the cause of this change, and what this change means. He
wonders: “[w]as there some subtle affinity between the chemical atoms, that shaped
themselves into form and colour on the canvas, and the soul that was within him? Could
it be that what the soul thought, they realized?...Or was there some other, more terrible
reason?” (81). What exactly the connection is between Dorian and the portrait is never
truly explained, and does not really matter. What matters is that “[i]t had made him
conscious how unjust, how cruel, he had been to Sibyl Vane” (81). He briefly comes to
believe that there is some good to come out of the changing of the portrait, resolving that
the portrait that Basil Hallward had painted of him would be a guide to him
through life, would be to him what holiness is to some, and conscience to others,
and the fear of God to us all. There were opiates for remorse, drugs that could lull
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the moral sense to sleep. But here was a visible symbol of the degradation of sin.
Here was an ever-present sign of the ruin men brought upon their souls. (81)
Dorian attempts to rectify this wrong, believing that “[t[here is a luxury in self-reproach”
(81). His attempt is not born of selflessness, or true pity for others, much less an
awakening love for Sibyl Vane. With regards to Sibyl, “[i]t was the girl’s fault, not his”
and “he had suffered also…She had marred him for a moment, if he had wounded her for
an age” (77). It is, instead, Dorian’s portrait that Dorian worries about and feels pity for.
The portrait, his double, is all that truly matters to the narcissistic Dorian, who confesses,
“I can’t bear the idea of my soul being hideous” (82). By his soul, Dorian means his
portrait, and if the portrait is hideous then so, in a way, is Dorian. As for Sibyl, she is
swiftly brushed aside as “one of the great romantic tragedies of the age” (91) who, in
Dorian’s words, “had no right to kill herself” (84).
Dorian’s main concern is to safeguard the portrait, which has become “the mask
of his shame” (80). Significantly, his chosen hiding place is the room once built for
Dorian to use “as a play-room when he was a child, and then as a study when he grew
somewhat older” (101). This room saw the development of Dorian; now it would see his
“degeneration.” Although Dorian is the only person with access to this room, he chooses
to cover the portrait with “a large purple satin coverlet heavily embroidered with gold”
that “his grandfather had found in a convent near Bologna” (98). Dorian recognizes
something ironic in the shroud:
It had perhaps served often as a pall for the dead. Now it was to hide something
that had a corruption of its own, worse than the corruption of death itself—
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something that would breed horrors and yet would never die. What the worm was
to the corpse, his sins would be to the painted image on the canvas. They would
mar its beauty, and eat away its grace. They would defile it, and make it shameful.
And yet the thing would still live on. It would always be alive. (99)
The fact that the portrait is wrapped in a death shroud becomes a symbol of the death of
Dorian’s own soul; a fact that Dorian, in a rare instance of awareness, realizes. Initially,
at least, this does not matter, as Judith Halberstam notes that “while his painting takes on
the appearance of depth, Dorian remains a perfect surface, a canvas stretched across a
soul” (54), and furthermore, “for Dorian, and one presumes for Wilde, the surface is all
that identity consists of” (63).
Wilde’s novel travels through many years in just a few hundred pages—less, in
the original Lippencott’s version. His chronology is confused and Wilde is careless with
specifics. As Dorian becomes increasingly more degenerate, and the portrait increasingly
reflects this degeneracy, Dorian’s attitude toward the portrait begins to change. Initially,
Dorian is delighted in viewing the change. The reader is informed that
often, on returning home from one of those mysterious and prolonged absences
that gave rise to such strange conjecture among those who were his friends, or
thought they were so, he himself would creep upstairs to the locked room, open
the door with the key that never left him now, and stand, with a mirror, in front of
the portrait that Basil Hallward had painted of him, looking now at the evil and
aging face on the canvas, and now at the fair young face that laughed back at him
from the polished glass. The very sharpness of the contrast used to quicken his
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sense of pleasure. He grew more and more enamoured of his own beauty, more
and more interested in the corruption of his own soul. He would examine with
minute care, and sometimes with a monstrous and terrible delight, the hideous
lines that seared the wrinkling forehead or crawled around the heavy sensual
mouth, wondering sometimes which were the more horrible, the signs of sin or
the signs of age. He would place his white hands beside the coarse bloated hands
of the picture, and smile. He mocked the misshapen body and the flailing limbs.
(106)
As for Dorian himself—the flesh and blood version—he “never knew…that somewhat
grotesque dread of mirrors, and polished metal surfaces, and still water” (105). His visage
never changes, although his reputation does. For a time—even, perhaps, until his death—
Dorian’s flawless appearance gives pause to those who whisper behind his back and
sometimes shun him. “Even those,” the reader is told, “who had heard the most evil
things against him, and from time to time strange rumours about his mode of life crept
through London and became the chatter of the clubs, could not believe anything to his
dishonour when they saw him…They wondered how one so charming and graceful as he
was could have escaped the stain of an age that was at once sordid and sensual” (106).
As noted above, the true extent of Dorian’s crimes is never drawn out. What is
known among polite society is that many whom Dorian befriends fall into ruin. There is a
possible element of homosexuality that accompanies many of Dorian’s sins. The reader
now knows that Wilde himself, along with Wilde’s homosexual companions, were forced
to hide their sexual proclivities from society. It would not be a surprise that Wilde would
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include homosexual practices as one of Dorian’s social “sins.” We get a glimpse of a
possible homosexuality in one scene where Basil confronts Dorian on the night of his
murder. Basil asks:
Why is your friendship so fatal to young men? There was that retched boy in the
Guards who committed suicide. You were his great friend. There was Sir Henry
Ashton, who had to leave England, with a tarnished name. You and he were
inseparable. What about Adrian Singleton, and his dreadful end? What about Lord
Kent’s son, and his career? I met his father yesterday in St. James’s Street. He
seemed broken with shame and sorrow. What about the young Duke of Perth?
What sort of life has he got now? What gentleman would associate with him?
Women are also ruined by association with Wilde, such as the wife of Lord Gloucester,
who “implicated” Dorian “in the most terrible confession [Basil] ever read” (128). There
is also the issue of Alan Campell, whose connection to Dorian is also unclear, but who
fears the secret Dorian holds against him so much that he is willing to become an
accomplice in erasing the evidence of Basil’s murder. Although Dorian remains a
member of polite society—Wotton, for one, never loses his friendship—it is clear that
Dorian is instrumental in bringing to ruin the lives of many who surround him.
The only time the reader is taken, firsthand, into Dorian’s degeneracy, is during a
visit to the opium dens along the docks. It is here the reader sees the sordidness, not
merely of Dorian’s own soul, but of the London that polite English society would rather
have forgotten—and often did. It is in these dens, in the hidden part of London, where the
abject castoffs—both of England and England’s far reaching empire—sought their
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pleasures, or relief from their pains. It is here the reader can get a sense of gnawing
despair:
Dorian winced, and looked round at the grotesque things that lay in such fantastic
postures on the ragged mattresses. The twisted limbs, the gaping mouths, the
staring lusterless eyes, fascinated him. He knew in what strange heavens they
were suffering, and what dull hells were teaching them the secret of some new
joy. They were better off than he was. He was prisoned in thought. Memory, like
a horrible malady, was eating his soul away. From time to time he seemed to see
the eyes of Basil Hallward looking at him. Yet he felt he could not stay…He
wanted to be where no one would know who he was. He wanted to escape from
himself. (156)
Pleasure and pain are married in Dorian’s mind by this point. While Dorian feels “the
terrible pleasure of a double life” (146), he also begins to be aware of a sense of guilt.
Excess, and the New Hedonism, which had been the cause of Dorian’s initial loss of
innocence, now becomes as much a burden as it is a pleasure.
The portrait, which had once so enthralled Dorian, begins to become a burden as
well. While Dorian is out living his life of sin and the senses, the portrait hangs in secret,
changing and aging with sin and time. Dorian grows increasingly paranoid that the
portrait may be discovered; so paranoid that “[h]e hated to be separated from the picture
that was such a part of his life, and was also afraid that during his absence some one
might gain access to the room, in spite of the elaborate bars that he had caused to be
placed upon the door” (118). His paranoia is so extreme that, while entertaining guests at
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his country estate, sometimes “he would suddenly leave his guests and rush back to town
to see that the door had not been tampered with, and that the picture was still there”
(118). Shortly before killing him, Dorian confesses to Basil of the portrait that “[i]t has
destroyed me” (131). He still appears at dinner parties, pleasing polite society, yet he no
longer takes pleasure in life. He becomes “sick with a wild terror of dying, and yet
indifferent to life itself” (165). When confronted by Lord Henry following the accidental
shooting of James Vane, Dorian tells the former: “My own personality has become a
burden to me. I want to escape, to go away, to forget” (169). Memory, like a persistent
mistress, hangs on.
Much of the language in Dorian Gray takes on the tone of confession and
repentance. It was a theme common to Wilde and his decadent peers. An attraction to
Catholicism was a feature of the life and works of many fin de siècle writers of Protestant
England and Wilde himself converted to Catholicism shortly before dying in Paris, the
birthplace of the Decadent movement. While it appears throughout the novel, in no place
is it more apparent than at the final scene. Thinking of the way his life had turned out,
Dorian’s thoughts turn to penance and punishment. It is not the first time Dorian feels
these sentiments, but it will be the final time. Thinking on his youth—his true youth, and
not the false youth the portrait had given him—Dorian “knew that he had tarnished
himself, filled his mind with corruption and given horror to his fancy; that he had been an
evil influence to others, and had experienced a terrible joy in being so” (181). Dorian
regrets having, in his youth, made the fateful prayer that ensured the portrait, and not
Dorian, would bear all the marks of age and sin. “Better for him that each sin of his life
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had brought its sure, swift penalty along with it. There was purification in punishment.
Not ‘Forgive us our sins’ but ‘Smite us for our iniquities’ should be the prayer of man to
a most just God’” (181). Dorian is aware that his secret double life, symbolized by the
contrast between his physical appearance and the appearance of the portrait, cannot be
reconciled. On the surface, Dorian appears to others to reflect a life lived morally and
without excess. It is only the portrait that remains the visual reminder of Dorian’s secret
iniquities. If the portrait, through physical alteration and decay, reflects the true soul of
Dorian Gray, then the painted Dorian must be the one who takes the punishment.
Dorian’s first action, the rage of a narcissist in revolt, is to smash the same Cupidrimmed mirror that had first reflected the difference between the flesh and blood Dorian
and the painted, corrupted Dorian. Smashing the mirror is a metaphor for the smashing of
Dorian’s illusions, and of a reflection Dorian no longer appreciated. Hoping that he had
begun to redeem himself—and that his redemption would begin to show in the portrait,
Dorian goes to look at his other self. What Dorian finds, to his dismay, is not a sign of
spiritual cleansing but “the curved wrinkle of the hypocrite” in the portrait’s mouth.
Contrary to reflecting a better self, the picture appears worse than ever. “Confess?”
Dorian wonders. “Did it mean that he was to confess” (182)? He feels, perhaps that “it
was his duty to confess, to suffer public shame, and to make public atonement.” That,
however, is not something Dorian is willing to do: “Was he really to confess? Never”
(183). Surface and image are everything. If there is a sacrifice, it had to be the other
Dorian—the portrait—that was sacrificed.
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Dorian stabs the painting with the same knife with which he had stabbed Basil
Hallward. A double murder was to be had at that blade: “As it [the knife] had killed the
painter, so it would kill the painter’s work, and all that meant. It would kill the past, and
when that was dead he would be free” (183). The painting “had been like conscience to
him” and “he would destroy it” (183). Dorian knows how closely the painting is tied to
his own soul, that it is an embodied manifestation of his soul. Yet, in his narcissism and
desire to truly have a clean slate, he does not realize that in killing the painting—the “real
Dorian”—he is killing himself. It is a suicide that is not a suicide. With all his talk of God
and repentance, Dorian does not truly desire repentance, just the idea of it. The Picture of
Dorian Gray may be “about” a lot of things: art, our relation to art, the society of Oscar
Wilde and his contemporaries, and decadence itself. It is also a reminder that one may
never truly escape one’s own sins, even if an image temporarily carries some of the
burden.
IV. Culture and Corruption
Dorian Gray represents many things, but above all he is representative of an
individual caught between two worlds. He is wealthy and beautiful, and admired by high
society for these traits. Yet he is corrupt: a man who, at a whim, will leave his wealth and
luxury to slink toward the darkest corners of London. Like Hyde, and like many of his
fellow aristocrats of the day, Dorian Gray has two faces. To his peers, he is admirable for
possessing the traits most would envy. Though he is suspect, avoided and rejected by
many who hear rumor of his exploits, Dorian’s wealth and beauty protect him from the
worst punishments. As those around him fall into disgrace, Dorian remains an image of
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beauty, a “beautiful caged thing” (139), whose worries are only the result of his own
darker urgings. Dorian Gray was not born for an abject existence; he cultivated it as an
art form.
“Death and vulgarity,” says Lord Henry, “are the only two facts in the nineteenth
century that one cannot explain away” (175). As the nineteenth century drew to a close,
so too, in many ways, did the earlier hopes of an England at the height of Empire.
Victorian England pretended to embody morality and respectability, yet held within its
borders an underbelly of poverty, addiction, and prostitution. The wealthy, like Lady
Agatha in Dorian Gray, undertook charitable missions to help feed and clothe the less
fortunate of English subjects. Then they took themselves back to their drawing rooms to
congratulate themselves for their good deeds. It was hypocrisies such as these that made
Oscar Wilde an opponent of charity. In “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” Wilde
wrote: “Accordingly, with admirable, though misdirected intentions, they [the majority of
people] very seriously and very sentimentally set themselves to the task of remedying the
evils that they see. But their remedies do not cure the disease: they merely prolong it.
Indeed, their remedies are part of the disease” (1). Wilde was a great critic of the society
that first lauded, then prosecuted, and ultimately punished him. In Dorian Gray, Wilde
uses a familiar Gothic form to further press this criticism. In constructing the character of
Dorian Gray, a man who, like the charitable figures who publicly perform good works
while remaining guilty of upholding a social structure that ultimately is responsible for
human suffering and abjection, Wilde is pointing out the divisions and contradictions
exemplified by an imperfect society.
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In commenting on the novel as an antidote to familiar Victorian literature,
Sheldon W. Liebman comments that
[i]n the typical Victorian novel, cosmic justice is confirmed (the good are
rewarded, though chastened, and the evil are punished), moral certainty is
attainable…personal responsibility is assumed, and self-unification is possible. In
the universe occupied by Dorian Gray, however, these verities do not hold. The
novel culminates in a suicide rather than a marriage…And the central character
disintegrates instead of acquiring a credible, coping self. In this respect, The
Picture of Dorian Gray signals the end of a literary era and looks forward to those
other turn-of-the-century and pre-World War I novels of cosmic despair and
moral paralysis. (313)
Donald R. Dickson holds a similar view of the novel and the era, noting both that “[t]he
failure of Dorian…to achieve the aesthetic ideals of Wilde’s generation clearly sounds
the death knell of the Aesthetic Movement even as it heralds the ennui of the fin de
siècle” (5), and “Dorian Gray is not simply the story of one man’s attempt at selfdiscovery. Sibyl, Dorian, Basil, and Lord Henry together seem to represent the failure of
an entire generation to achieve its ideals” (13). If this seems too pessimistic, the reader
should remember that Dorian Gray never truly has a resolution. Perhaps Dorian’s death
is a redemption of sorts; perhaps not. He is certainly not a likeable enough, or even
drawn-out enough, character to generate any sort of pathos. His story ends with a suicide
and a discovery; that is all. The only survivor in the novel, apart from the unrelenting
Lord Henry, is the portrait itself, hanging handsomely just the way Basil had painted it
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years before. It is the surface that matters, after all, and Dorian’s youthful image is the
one thing that lives on.
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“THE TRAGEDY OF UNFULFILLED AIMS”: THOMAS HARDY’S JUDE THE
OBSCURE

I. A “distinctly ‘modern’ work”
Written at the tail end of the nineteenth century, Thomas Hardy’s Jude the
Obscure is the last and, according to many of its critics, the darkest of his novels.
According to David Lodge, “Jude the Obscure is, by general agreement, Thomas Hardy’s
bleakest, most pessimistic, most depressing novel” (195). Laura Green is in agreement,
calling Jude “the most radical as well as the most pessimistic of Hardy’s novels” (526).
Taking into context the general pessimism and social criticism represented in Hardy’s
oeuvre, modern critical response to Hardy’s final novel is telling. The novel itself was
greeted by a perplexed and often combative audience of contemporary critics. Like Wilde
not long before him, Hardy’s novel was considered obscene by many, who found its
depictions of marriage and (female) sexuality, as well as its blatant attacks on traditional
institutions, unforgivable. A. Alvarez has observed that Jude is Hardy’s
finest novel…yet its publication in 1895 provoked an outcry as noisy as that
which recently greeted Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The press attacked in a pack,
lady reviewers became hysterical, abusive letters poured in, and a bishop
solemnly burnt the book… The real blow to the eminently shockable Victorian
public was the fact that Hardy treated the sexual undertheme of his book more or
less frankly: less frankly, he complained, than he had wished, but more frankly
than was normal or acceptable. (113)
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Even Hardy’s wife, a devoutly religious woman, was appalled by Hardy’s work.
Following its publication and the ensuing attacks by both critics and moralists alike, an
embittered Hardy gave up novel writing altogether and spent the remaining decades of
his life focused on poetry, the latter also being considered a less “feminine” form of selfexpression than prose (Green 525).
Outrage is not uncommon in our own, comparably more secular age. However,
the treatment Jude received, along with the works of contemporaries of Hardy like Wilde
and Lawrence, may seem extreme, even quaint. While sex provides a major backdrop to
the novel, the actual act is merely hinted at, a desire that is fully present yet graphically
absent in the text itself. The murder-suicide of Little Father Time and Jude and Sue’s
younger children is horrifying, yet suicide itself was nothing new for English literature.
Curiously, though the murder-suicide scene is perhaps the most shocking part of the
novel, it produced much less outrage than the arguably more mundane aspects of the
novel: its discussion of marriage, the church, and other institutions that Victorian society
ostensibly held dear, yet which faced many upheavals throughout the nineteenth century,
particularly as the twentieth century drew nearer.
Jude the Obscure is an undeniably Victorian novel in structure and language, yet
as a work of historical significance it appears to straddle two literary eras—that of the
Victorian and that of the modernist. In scope, it positions itself in the nineteenth century,
while looking forward to the twentieth. Hardy’s biographer Irving Howe asserted that
Jude the Obscure is Hardy’s most distinctly ‘modern’ work, for it rests upon a
cluster of assumptions central to modernist literature: that in our time men
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wishing to be more than dumb clods must live in permanent doubt and intellectual
crisis; that for such men, to whom traditional beliefs are no longer available, life
has become inherently problematic; that in the course of their years they must
face even more than the usual allotment of loneliness and anguish; that in their
cerebral overdevelopment they run the danger of losing those primary appetites
for life which keep the human race going; and that courage, if it is to be found at
all, consists in a readiness to accept pain while refusing the comforts of certainty.
(134)
Howe has identified the existential crises plaguing many men of Hardy’s generation—a
generation that includes Stevenson and Wilde—which resulted in the sense of abjection
displayed by characters like Jude. Furthermore, Howe continues, “Hardy’s last novel was
not quite the outcry of a lonely and embittered iconoclast that it has sometimes been said
to be. Jude displeased official opinion, both literary and moral; it outraged the pieties of
middle-class England to an extent few of Hardy’s contemporaries were inclined to risk;
but it also reflected the sentiments of advanced intellectual circles in the 1890s” (134).
Perhaps the extreme response to Jude had less to do with the novel itself than with a
reaction to changes occurring in society during the later years of the Victorian era—an
era that, from its inception, saw frequent fluctuations in its social order, whether those
changes were economic, scientific, or religious. Any major changes in any given society
produce conservative backlash and a desire to regress to a more comfortable familiarity,
whether or not the perceived stability of familiarity is based in reality. Fear of change is
endemic, and any age becomes an “age of anxiety” when divisions arise.
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The response to Hardy’s last novel is also, it must be noted, an example of
Victorian hypocrisy. As has been noted elsewhere, the Victorians (in general) perceived
themselves, at least outwardly, to be moral and upstanding. However, in most cases the
reality was much different. While sexual modesty was lauded, prostitution thrived, and
while national prosperity seemed assured for many, millions more lived in squalor. It was
a paradox that, while not entirely ignored by the Victorian public, was seen as an ill to be
given public lip service while the underlying problems were never really resolved. What
Hardy was doing in Jude was, in one sense, merely laying on the page what existed in
society itself. The central characters of Jude and Sue may be figurative and literal
outsiders in the novel—shut out from institutions, shunned for their unconventional
lifestyle, and feeling internally in opposition to, even sometimes in revolt against, the
world immediately surrounding them—yet I would argue that they are more
representative than atypical of the age they inhabited. In many cases, it is a war waged
against themselves, and their own thwarted ambitions, that cause Jude and Sue such
distress, more than the social order that appears to reject them. In truth, it is Sue, and
eventually Jude who pull away from the outside world, as much as the outside world
pulls away from them. In order to justify their choices and their actions, Jude and Sue are
drawn further towards each other, selfishly retreating to their own inner circle as a
bulwark against forces that are sometimes, though not always, out of their control. If they
are symbols of abjection, it is not merely that abjection has been thrust upon them but
that they enact and perform an abject existence as the only available option in a world
they cannot fully comprehend, with values they do not share.
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That is not to say that Jude and Sue are not sympathetic characters. They are
entirely sympathetic, and their tragic destinies are no less heartbreaking for their own
culpability. On the contrary, I would argue that their culpability makes them even more
sympathetic. Victorian literature is filled with despairing characters who face tragic fates.
Sentimentality was a common feature of nineteenth century British literature—who can
forget Little Nell from Dickens’ The Old Curiosity Shop—but much of the affect in
sentimental literature relied on the power of forces outside the characters’ control. Such
characters are often unwilling victims rather than consciously acting participants. Sue and
Jude, despite their relatively humble status, do not fall into that category. Whether or not
they realize it—and in many cases they do seem willfully unaware—the lives they lead
are mostly, of their own doings and decisions. As a writer, Hardy was no stranger to
affect or sentimentality. But Jude is a decidedly unsentimental novel. One may weep with
Sue over the unfortunate deaths of the three young children. Yet the reader must
remember that it was Little Father Time whose hands caused the deaths of the two
younger ones, and then himself. Sue also has some blame for the incident, as it is her
fatalist talk to Little Father Time that unwittingly and ultimately drives him to perform
that dreadful act.
This chapter proposes that while Jude and Sue—and by extension Little Father
Time—are indeed victims of circumstances outside their control, they are largely to
blame for their own ultimate downfalls, whether that fate means death, as with Jude, or
self-imprisonment in an unwanted marriage, as Sue ultimately consigns herself to.
Perhaps it is true that, as Aunt Fawley warns Jude, fate itself has caused marriage to end
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in such misery for the Fawleys (13). But such prophecies are often self-fulfilling, and
whatever abjection Jude and Sue experience—and their abjection arises in many forms—
they are ultimately the abject creators of their own misery. As self-destructive as they are,
together and apart, and as abject as they become, their own inner turmoil is their greatest
foe. Of course, the world is not kind to the pair. But neither are they kind to themselves,
or each other for that matter. As sincere as is their affection, so is their ultimate
separation and descent into abjection inevitable.
II. “One Person Split in Two”
Although this study is primarily rooted in a theory of abjection, it has examined
the appearance of the double in the works being analyzed. This is not an accident, since,
as abjection is rooted in the self, the appearance of abjection is always caused by a
splitting of the self. In Jude, the appearance of the double is not as immediately apparent
as it is in the works of Stevenson or Wilde, yet when one takes a close look, it is just as
present. Sue and Jude, although cousins, begin by leading very different lives, with
different views that are sometimes diametrically opposed: Sue’s heathenism versus
Jude’s Christianity, Jude’s sensuality versus Sue’s apparent asexuality, or Sue’s
flightiness versus Jude’s constancy. Yet once they come together, they cannot seem to
stay apart for long. They pathologically rely on each other, enmeshed in a relationship
that would in later decades likely be called codependent. As Phillotson observes, when
discussing with Gillingham the end of his marriage: “I have been struck with these two
facts; the extraordinary sympathy, or similarity, between the pair…They seem to be one
person split in two” (183)!
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Before they even meet, Jude, in a characteristic fashion, creates an ideal of Sue
that is not reflective of her true person. Initially unwilling to betray his aunt’s warning
against pursuing an acquaintance with his cousin, Jude, somewhat creepily “kept watch
over [Sue], and liked to feel she was there. The consciousness of her living presence
stimulated him. But she remained more or less an ideal character, about whose form he
began to weave curious and fantastic day-dreams” (73). Jude’s feelings toward Sue, as a
married adult, are not at all unlike his childhood fantasies of Christminster. Such wishful
fantasy-making remains a central part of Jude’s personality until near the end of the
novel, when disillusionment finally, fatally sets in. His perception of the cousin he does
not yet know is somewhat in opposition to the real Sue. Jude, spying on Sue working in
the “sweet, saintly, Christian business” of her employment (72), or attending church (74),
thinks of Sue as “a kindly star, an elevating power, a companion in Anglican worship, a
tender friend” (74). Sue, however, possesses a more secular worldview, at one point
purchasing two statuettes, of Venus and Apollo, from a street vendor and “enter[ing] with
her heathen load into the most Christian city in the country” (77). Jude, later hearing that
Sue’s statuettes had been broken by Miss Fontover, assumes, quite incorrectly, that the
statuary was “[t]oo Catholic-Apostolic for [Miss Fontover]…No doubt she called them
Popish images,” to which Sue ambiguously replies, “[i]t was for quite some other reason
that she didn’t like my patron-saints” (84). Jude is eventually distressed to discover that
Sue does not share his religious feeling, twice comparing her to Voltaire (122, 133).
When Sue recounts once “cutting up all the Epistles and Gospels into separate brochures,
and re-arranging them in chronological order” (121), Jude experiences “a sense of
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sacrilege” (122). Sue’s reply to Jude is, “you take so much tradition on trust that I don’t
know what to say” (123).
Despite their intellectual differences, sexual incompatibility, and Jude’s legal
attachment to Arabella, Jude remains almost obsessively devoted to Sue. Although Sue
eventually senses Jude’s true feelings, she responds platonically to his devotion. Desiring
as she does to be considered intellectually as an equal to men, she resents their sexual
attraction toward her. While Sue’s interests in men are cerebral, they cannot help but be
drawn to her physically. Sue’s response to unwanted sexual attraction is to initially reject
the sexual act altogether, an act of abjection that is intended to sustain the intellectual
purity of the relationship. Sue’s desire for physical autonomy also reflects the desired
goals of the New Woman ideal emerging around the same time. However, while New
Woman feminism often embraced sexual freedom, Sue’s response is to reject physical
intimacy. Later in the novel, when Sue thoroughly castigates herself for the deaths of the
children, it is with language that evokes sin (209), defilement (320), and fleshly
mortification (272). Ironically, while Jude professes a Christian devotion, though it is
“rather on an intellectual track than a theological” (72), he is the one who is still married
and who occasionally indulges in the generally un-Christian practices of extramarital sex
and drinking to intoxication. Jude pines after Sue while still married to Arabella; resents
her marriage to Phillotson, though he is still married to Arabella; and struggles constantly
against his own weaknesses to women and drink. It is Sue who, although throughout most
of the novel feels antipathy toward religion, remains willingly, even stubbornly, chaste.
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Such chastity on her part is frustrating to the men who find themselves drawn to her
though they, curiously, patiently endure it.
Sue’s aversion toward sex has not been ignored by Jude’s critics. Immediately
following its publication, reviewers arguably focused as much on the “representation of
Sue’s ‘pathological’ sexuality” (Green 539) as they did Jude’s educational aspirations.
Regarding this curious focus of attention, Laura Green argues that
reviewers could overlook the fact that Sue’s story was one of intellectual
ambition, and Jude’s one of sexual weakness, partly because tradition assigns the
woman the sexual, and the man the intellectual, role in narratives of the Fall. In
fact, Jude the Obscure challenges precisely such distinctions between character as
socially contingent and character as inherently constituted and, most
fundamentally, between masculine and feminine fulfillment. If the novel is
explicitly concerned with Jude’s intellectual aspirations and their failure, it is
equally explicitly concerned with Sue’s intellect, while, despite the fascination
exerted by Sue’s sexual peculiarities, it is Jude whose sexual appetite precipitates
the tragic action. (537)
Green connects this contemporary preoccupation concerning Sue’s sexuality (or lack
thereof) with resistance against the New Woman literature circulating during the same
time as Jude, pointing out that “[m]any critics who disparaged Jude did so by associating
it with ‘New Woman’ narratives” though Hardy himself “hesitantly” rejected this claim
(539). However, Hardy, in an 1895 letter to Sir Edmund Gosse, insists that
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there is nothing perverted or depraved in Sue’s nature. The abnormalism consists
in disproportion, not in inversion, her sexual instinct being healthy as far as it
goes, but unusually weak and fastidious. Her sensibilities remain painfully alert
notwithstanding, as they do in nature with such women. One point illustrating this
I could not dwell upon: that, though she has children, her intimacies with Jude
have never been more than occasional, even when they were living together…and
one of her reasons for fearing the marriage ceremony is that she fears it would be
breaking faith with Jude to withhold herself at pleasure, or altogether, after it;
though while uncontracted she feels at liberty to yield herself as seldom as she
chooses. This has tended to keep his passion as hot at the end as at the beginning,
and helps to break his heart. He has never really possessed her as freely as he
desired…Sue is a type of woman which has always had an attraction for me, but
the difficulty of drawing the type has kept me from attempting it till now. (349)
Hardy’s suggestion that Sue possesses a normal sexuality but that she prefers to
“withhold herself at pleasure” is a revealing look into the crafting of Sue’s view of sex
and her sexuality. That Hardy confesses to “an attraction for” women like Sue also
reveals the carefulness with which he crafted her character, and the sympathy he felt for
Sue. Whether or not Hardy’s insistence that Sue possessed a “healthy” sexuality is
supported by the text is up for debate, and ultimately depends on the individual reader.
However, despite Hardy’s explanations concerning his character, the text of the novel
does reveal some aversion toward the sexual act on Sue’s part. This sentiment is revealed
when Sue first reunites with Jude after leaving Phillotson. She has consented to live with
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Jude but continues to resist a physical connection. When Jude accuses her of being
“incapable of real love” (192), Sue responds “in hurt tones,”
my liking for you is not as some women perhaps. But it is a delight in being with
you, of a supremely delicate kind, and I don’t want to go further and risk it by—
an attempt to intensify it! I quite realized that, as woman with man, it was a risk to
come. But, as me with you, I resolved to trust you to set my wishes above your
gratification.” (192)
Sue admits to being aware of Jude’s physical desire for her but she does not share that
desire. However, more than merely restraining from having sex with Jude, Sue appears to
resent Jude’s having sex at all. When Sue discovers that Jude had had relations with
Arabella at the same hotel they are staying at, Sue becomes “so mortified that [Jude] was
obliged to take her into her room and close the door lest the people should hear” (194).
Sue accuses Jude of being “treacherous…to have her again!” and asks him why he is so
“gross” (194). Writing on the topic, T. R. Wright notes that
the more the New Woman attempts to escape the role of erotic object to which so
many men reduce her, the more she succeeds only in provoking still more sexual
interest, offering in addition to her other charms the challenge of a difficult
conquest. As a pioneering feminist Sue Bridehead fails fully to overcome the
problem of liberating herself from male expectations without repressing her own
sexuality. As a late Victorian she finds herself torn between ascetic and
hedonistic, Hebraic and Hellenistic, tendencies—unable to free herself, in spite of
her ‘mental emancipation’, from a deeply ingrained fear of sexuality. (120)
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For women, and particularly for the New Woman, sexual attractiveness has socially and
historically been a defining feature of femaleness. This is true regardless of whether such
an intrinsically sexual nature is desired or repelled by a particular society. For the
Victorians, woman was considered at both extremes: they were either good and pure—
the “Angel in the House” celebrated in an 1854 poem by Coventry Patmore—or they
were villainous and man-consuming. (Bram Dijkstra does a decent job of tracing these
competing ideals in Idols of Perversity: Fantasies of Feminine Evil in Fin de siècle
Culture.) Being reduced to either extreme left women like Sue little room to fully
develop into complex, self-actualized humans. Hardy’s characterization of Sue is largely
an attempt to dispel the myth of the one-dimensional female. Opinions are bound to
differ, and there can be no true consensus regarding Sue’s sexual nature; she is, after all,
a complex character with complex feelings who often appears unable to understand her
own continually inconstant emotions. If she appears to experience abjection at the
prospect of the sexual act, it is at least partly a resistance to being objectified and reduced
to a sexual being. With Sue’s characterization, Hardy is rejecting the familiar Victorian
image of the woman’s role as wife and mother. Sue seeks her own freedom from these
gendered restrictions, and her inability to fully escape her sexual nature causes those
desires to turn inward, into abjection.
Throughout her marriage to Phillotson, Sue recoils from consummating their
union to a degree that would certainly seem abnormal. Rather than sleep in the same bed
with her husband, Sue sleeps in a cramped and windowless closet where “spiders’ webs
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hung overhead” (176). She eventually insists on separate bedrooms; late one night
Phillotson’s
preoccupation was such that, though he now slept on the other side of the house,
he mechanically went to the room that he and his wife had occupied when he first
became a tenant of Old Grove Place, which since his differences with Sue had
been hers exclusively. He entered, and unconsciously began to undress…There
was a cry from the bed, and a quick movement. Before the schoolmaster had
realized where he was he perceived Sue starting up half-awake, staring wildly,
and springing out upon the floor…Before he had thought that she meant to do
more than get air she had mounted upon the sill and leapt out. She disappeared in
the darkness, and he heard her fall below. (180)
Sue’s reluctance to have sex with Phillotson could be explained as an aversion to the man
himself or the age difference between them, or her love for Jude. Yet the text does not
entirely bear this out as a simple explanation. Discussing her unhappy marriage with
Jude, Sue confesses that
[i]t is said that what a woman shrinks from—in the early days of her marriage—
she shakes down to with comfortable indifference in half-a-dozen years. But that
is much like saying that the amputation of a limb is no affliction, since a person
gets comfortably accustomed to the use of a wooden leg or arm in the course of
time!...But it is not as you think!—there is nothing wrong except my own
wickedness, I suppose you’d call it—a repugnance on my part, for a reason I
cannot disclose, and what would not be admitted as one by the world in
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general…What tortures me so much is the necessity of being responsive to this
man whenever he wishes, good as he is morally!—the dreadful contract to feel in
a particular way in a matter whose essence is its voluntariness!...I wish he would
beat me, or be faithless to me, or do some open thing that I could talk about as a
justification for feeling as I do! But he does nothing, except that he has grown a
little cold since he has found out how I feel. (169)
Sue’s admission that she would prefer Phillotson beat her is startling and not a little
masochistic. That Sue possesses masochistic tendencies is apparent elsewhere in Jude,
and ultimately becomes her remaining method for penance by the end of the novel. That
Sue believes her aversion to be “wickedness” also foreshadows her eventual selfabjection and abnegation. Following the deaths of the children, when Sue enters into a
life of complete penance and returns to Phillotson, she ultimately gives herself to him,
telling Mrs. Edlin, “I am going to make my conscience right on my duty to Richard—by
doing a penance” (313). Sue’s immediate and complete reversal of her strongly held,
independent opinions will be discussed further, but for now I will add that when Mrs.
Edlin tells Jude that Sue had begun submitting herself to Phillotson sexually, the widow
contends that it is “as a punishment to her poor self” (317). Sue’s ultimate physical
submission to Phillotson does not come from a change in attitude toward sex but a desire
to enact, through sex, her repulsion toward herself. Sue still experiences abjection in the
sexual act and has embraced her sexual abjection as a form of masochistic atonement.
Regardless of Sue’s sexuality, whether it is a general repugnance, a desire for
physical autonomy of her person, or some mixture of the two, Sue possesses ideas about
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gender that are non-conforming, particularly for the society she is rebelling against. At
times she appears genuinely naïve concerning relations between men and women. During
one conversation she tells Jude:
My life has been entirely shaped by what people call a peculiarity in me. I have
no fear of men, as such, nor of their books. I have mixed with them—one or two
of them particularly—almost as one of their own sex. I mean I have not felt about
them as most women are taught to feel—to be on their guard against attacks on
their virtue; for no average man—no man short of a sensual savage—will molest
a woman by day or night, at home or abroad, unless she invites him. Until she
says by a look “Come on” he is always afraid to, and if you never say it, or look
it, he never comes. (118)
Sue’s belief in the culpability of women in their own sexual assault is innocent at best,
dangerous at worst. Although on the one hand it suggests Sue’s belief in a woman’s
control over her own sexuality, it also reveals a wishful belief in the basic goodness of
mankind. She may initially have lived a life arguably more worldly than the more rurally
based Jude, but up until this point she inadvertently admits to a life that is innocently
cloistered. This is supported by her confessions regarding the status of her loveless
marriage to Phillotson, including her statement to Jude that “before I married [Phillotson]
I had never thought out fully what marriage meant, even though I knew. It was idiotic of
me—there is no excuse. I was old enough, and I thought I was very experienced” (171).
There are many aspects of marriage Sue could be referring to: the perceived and legal
role of a Victorian woman to be submissive to her husband, the “sordid” nature of sexual
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union, or the permanent status of marriage. It is likely all of these things and more Sue
objects to, and for which she regrets her rather rash decision to marry Phillotson.
Sue desires, above all, a platonic relationship with men, and that is likely one of
the reasons she resents their physical desire for her. She recalls to Jude that
[w]hen I was eighteen I formed a friendly intimacy with an undergraduate at
Christminster…We used to go about together—on walking tours, reading tours,
and things of that sort—like two men almost. He asked me to live with him, and I
agreed to by letter. But when I joined him in London I found he meant a different
thing from what I meant. He wanted me to be his mistress, in fact, but I wasn’t in
love with him…He said I was breaking his heart by holding out against him so
long at such close quarters; he could never have believed it of woman. I might
play that game once too often, he said…His death caused a terrible remorse in me
for my cruelty…He left me a little money—because I broke his heart, I suppose.
That’s how men are—so much better than women! (118)
Sue’s naivety is once again at work here, but there is something else that is expressed—
Sue’s desire for a male companionship that is completely free of sexual desire. Richard
Dellamora draws attention to Sue’s relative lack of female companionship throughout the
novel. According to Dellamora, “[t]he careful hedging of Sue from intimacy with other
women has a valence within the male homosocial economy of the book since Hardy was
aware that her wish to retain control of her own body was liable to be construed in
contemporary sexology as a sign of sexual inversion” (255). It is true that Sue seeks out
little female companionship, seemingly desiring connections with men that are purely
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intellectual. In an act of psychological gender bending, Sue desires to be seen as “one of
the men,” an intellectual equal. That the men she draws close to her—Jude, Phillotson,
and the unnamed deceased undergraduate—desire her physically as well as intellectually,
causes everyone involved heartache. Jude desires her mind, but also her body, and at one
point we are told, “[i]f [Jude] could only get over the sense of her sex, as she seemed to
be able to do so easily of his, what a comrade she could make” (123). Later in the novel,
as Sue prepares to leave Jude for the last time, Jude laments that “perhaps I spoilt one of
the highest and purest loves that ever existed between man and woman” (28), through the
act of sex.
In many ways, Sue and Jude represent two halves of a soul/body union. They also
appear to switch gender roles, at least in their traditional symbolism. Sue takes on a role
as the airy symbol of cold intellect, or one who is bodiless and simply soul, while Jude—
coarse, rustic, highly sexed—is the body and the earth. In many descriptions, Hardy
draws an image of Sue that seems at times almost disembodied. In one image, we are
told, “she hardly touched the ground” (231). Jude calls her “the most ethereal, least
sensual woman I ever knew to exist without human sexlessness” (272), and, a short time
later, “a sort of fay, or sprite—not a woman!” (279). Compared to Arabella’s fleshy
womanliness, Sue appears almost androgynous, physically a woman but rejecting all that
her physical body might entail. Throughout most of the novel, Sue rejects the supposed
physical limitations of being a woman. In doing so, Sue is also rejecting the commonly
perceived social limitations of womanhood. Unlike Jude, Sue desires neither to be
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physically man nor woman; she wishes only to be Sue, respected for her mind and not her
body.
III. “Done because we are too menny”
Little Father Time, despite or, perhaps more likely because of his name, seems
timeless. Born from the fleshy union of Jude and Arabella, the boy is an anomaly. A
proverbial “old soul,” he never seems to have been a child at all. He is representative of
the new generation Irving Howe spoke about for whom “life has become inherently
problematic” and who “accept pain while refusing the comforts of certainty.” From our
first description of Little Father Time, we are told that
[h]e was Age masquerading as Juvenility, and doing it so badly that his real self
showed through crevices. A ground swell from ancient years of night seemed now
and then to lift the child in this his morning-life, when his face took a back view
over some great Atlantic of Time, and appeared not to care about what it saw.
(218)
Though still a small child, Little Father Time has already adopted the fin de siècle
attitude of ennui. Although he appears to become almost instantly attached to Jude, and
especially Sue, nothing they do for him brings him any joy. When they bring him to the
local Agricultural Show in an attempt to “try every means of making him kindle and
laugh like other boys” (231), Little Father Time remains unaffected. Sue is aware of his
indifference, noting that “though they had taken him to everything likely to attract a
young intelligence, they had utterly failed to interest” him (235). Little Father Time
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knew what they [Jude and Sue] were saying and thinking. “I am very, very sorry,
father and mother,” he said. “But please don’t mind!—I can’t help it. I should like
the flowers very very much, if I didn’t keep on thinking they’d be all withered in
a few days!” (235)
Little Father Time’s seemingly innate despair and nihilism causes him to look at flowers
and see their eventual decay. Life, for him, is not about beginnings but always the
eventual end.
Despite his chronological youth, Little Father Time gives the impression of an old man,
one who has seen and done it all, and has no more desire for experience. A “singular
child” (221), he is described as seeming “like an enslaved and dwarfed Divinity,” who
speaks “impassively,” and when we see him travelling alone to meet with Jude for the
first time, we are told that he “fell into a steady mechanical creep which had in it an
impersonal quality—the movement of the wave, or of the breeze, or of the cloud” (220).
He is not emotionless; upon meeting Sue, he asks if he can call her mother and “a
yearning look came over the child and he began to cry” (220). He is a child that was
never wanted, and his desperation and preternatural wisdom reflects that. He sees
beyond, or seems to see beyond, the immediate world around him. Jude and Sue find him
“to be in the habit of sitting silent, his quaint and weird face set, and his eyes resting on
things they did not see in the substantial world” (221). He was given no name at birth,
merely the nickname “Little Father Time…because I look so aged, they say” (221).
Quiet, morose, he takes up so little space that “[Sue and Jude] were hardly conscious of
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him” (223). Despite his relative lack of youthful enthusiasm for the world, Little Father
Time is more his father than his mother, as Philip M. Weinstein notes:
[Arabella is] exactly as well adjusted to the meaningless conditions of life as
Father Time is incapable of coping with them…That solemn child is the ultimate
doomed Platonist in Hardy’s world. Absorbing somewhere in his consciousness
the full ravage wrought by time upon value, he has frozen his perception of the
world into a posture of unforgivable stasis. He lives in a perpetuated, lastjudgment landscape, all things appearing to him in their form of final exhaustion.
(247)
Despite his often apparent lack of emotion, Little Father Time has Jude’s sometimes
crippling sensitivity. Far before his time, he seems to be aware of something—some
otherworldly pain—that most people are not. He is the manifestation of a worldly
abjection, who seems destined for a doomed end, before his life has even really begun. It
is not just the flowers whose eventual decay prohibits Little Father Time from enjoying
them; this sentiment is carried over onto everything the child encounters.
His strange outsider status allows him to fit in well with Sue and Jude, who
christen him after his father, and vow to love him. Before and after the births of the
younger children, the three of them form a family unit that seems at odds with the rest of
the world. They appear to exist on the outskirts of society, working within it for a living,
but socially separated from it. For a time, and for Little Father Time’s sake, Jude and Sue
discuss getting married. While witnessing a marriage, they discuss themselves and the
prospect of a legal union between them. During their conversation, “Jude said
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he…thought they [Jude and Sue] were both too thin-skinned—and they ought never to
have been born” (226). Jude expresses a belief that “they were unlike other people”
(227), and thereby unfit for a normal, married, family life. Interestingly, Sue challenges
this idea because she
still held that there was not much queer or exceptional in them: that all were so.
“Everybody is getting to feel as we do. We are a little beforehand, that’s all. In
fifty, a hundred, years the descendants of these two [the couple getting married]
will act and feel worse than we. They will see weltering humanity still more
vividly than we do now, as ‘Shapes like our own selves hideously multiplied’ [a
line from Shelley] and will be afraid to reproduce them.” (227)
Sue appears to prophetically sense something despairing in the future generation that
Jude is not yet willing to see. Hardy places in Sue’s words an ominous warning regarding
the fate of humanity that looks forward to the pessimistic tones of the modernists.
Nevertheless, despite Sue’s proclamation of generational solidarity, Jude holds tight to
his outsider status, exclaiming, shortly before the deaths of the young children, “I am an
outsider to the end of my days” (259)!
This sense of not belonging to a particular community causes an existential crisis
and ultimately plays a large part in their downfall. J. B. Bullen remarks that
[i]n the case of Sue and Jude, existential anxieties, problems about faith, and
doubt about action and moral judgement, and above all about the value and status
of marriage, are expressed in debate, discussion, and argument, all of which allow
no time to observe or contemplate those things lying beyond the immediate sphere
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of interest. It is as if their anxieties actually generate a form of sensory
deprivation, which forces them to exist in a kind of limbo, cut off and remote
from external sources of pleasure and joy. (237)
The two are so wrapped up in each other that they seem to orbit each other, all but
oblivious to the world around them and the communities they live in. Naturally, they feel
the pangs of rejection when their unconventional way of living is questioned and they are
shunned. This is particularly damaging when their means of living becomes an issue and
they cannot work. But they do not desire, as others do, a solid place in their community,
preferring to live as they please, regardless of convention. As it particularly affects Sue,
Rosemarie Morgan writes that
[i]n Jude, Hardy addresses himself to the dual issue of woman’s obligation to
submit to ‘present pernicious conventions’ and the long-term psychological
effects of this—the long term effects of her enforced repression, subjection and
degradation…Sue’s socio-political outlook, in which she is not typical of any one
faction, class or category…allows Hardy to perceive her as set-apart, unique, the
‘outsider’ he himself can identify with. However, in so far as she is sexually
repressed, psychologically conditioned a ‘loser’, a ‘casualty’ of her class and
background, she is representative of her suffragist peers who, in the public sphere
at least, accommodated similar frustrations and defeats and encountered
comparable destructive attitudes. (114)
Despite Jude’s yearning to become a part of the church intelligentsia, the two express
little to no political consciousness. Although Sue rails against conventions like marriage
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and the church, she does so privately, without seeming to make any moves to change
things. She is intellectual but apolitical, and her self-absorbed nature causes her to view
the world as callously unfair rather than malleable. When rumors regarding her
relationship with Jude begin to circle at the college where she is training to become a
teacher (112), Sue’s reaction is to escape through a window and go to Jude, despite
knowing what potential repercussions would befall her rebellion. Excusing herself to
Jude, Sue protests “[t]hey locked me up for being out with you; and it seemed so unjust
that I couldn’t bear it” (115). Later, Sue castigates Jude for calling her “a creature of
civilization,” insisting rather that she is “a sort of negation of it.” Jude’s response is to
comment that Sue doesn’t “talk quite like a girl” (117). For Sue, any act of social or
political disobedience begins and ends with a reaction to perceived personal unfairness.
She is trapped in the limitations of her womanhood, but she, like Jude, is also trapped by
her own willful self-destruction.
Self-destruction in the novel culminates in the murder-suicide of Little Father
Time and Jude and Sue’s two younger children. Arguably one of the most heartbreaking
scenes in English literature, the murder-suicide is the catalyst that drives Sue and Jude
apart: Sue to her penitential remarriage to Phillotson, and Jude to his death. Naturally,
this is a novel, and Hardy has crafted his characters to do as he wills them to satisfy his
meaning and narrative, but the reader can still ask whether the incident would have been
preventable or not. Little Father Time, with his fatalistic personality and outlook, seems
to have always been doomed for a tragic end. But his conversation with Sue the night
before the hangings also lays some blame with Sue. In a seemingly uncharacteristic
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tantrum, Little Father Time is panicked by the family’s unfortunate situation and “a
brooding undemonstrative horror seemed to have seized him” (263). A mentally healthy
mother would have, we would hope, put aside her own turmoil and helped comfort a
frightened child, but Sue gives in to her negativity, telling Little Father Time that there is
nothing the latter can do, and that “[a]ll is trouble, adversity and suffering” (263)! When
Little Father Time asks, somewhat rhetorically, whether “[i]t would be better to be out o’
the world than in it, wouldn’t it?” Sue only replies, “[i]t would almost, dear” (263). Upon
hearing that there would soon be another child in the family, Little Father Time “jump[s]
up wildly” and scolds Sue, telling her “I won’t forgive you, ever, ever” (264)! This is
extreme behavior for a relatively undemonstrative child, yet Sue is still too wrapped up in
her own worry to soothe him.
When the children are found hanging the following morning, Sue is
understandably inconsolable. Little Father Time’s suicide note: “Done because we are too
menny” (266) causes her to realize her conversation with the boy the night before had
ultimately driven him to the act. The shock and grief then causes her to lose the fourth
child, who is stillborn. While Sue is lost in her grief and self-reproach, Jude assures her
that
[i]t was in his [Little Father Time’s] nature to do it. The doctor says there are such
boys springing up amongst us—boys of a sort unknown in the last generation—
the outcome of new views of life. They seem to see all its terrors before they are
old enough to have staying power to resist them. He says it is the beginning of the
coming universal wish not to live. (266)
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This is an eerie echo of Sue’s earlier statement about coming generations “feel[ing]
worse than we,” as well as Hardy’s near-prophetic foresight into the nihilism of some of
the future modernist generation. As for Jude and Sue, this single incident destroys them.
Jude still desires a union, and a life with Sue, which he will do until the end of his life,
but Sue can only exclaim that “our perfect union—our two-in-oneness—is now stained
with blood” (267)!
This is the point where, for all intents and purposes, Jude and Sue switch places. It
is not something that is lost on Jude, as we are told that
[o]ne thing troubled him more than any other; that Sue and himself had mentally
travelled in opposite directions since the tragedy: events which had enlarged his
own views of life, laws, customs, and dogmas, had not operated in the same
manner on Sue’s. She was no longer the same as in the independent days, when
her intellect played like lambent lightning over conventions and formalities which
he at that time respected, though he did not now. (272)
Jude loses the faith he had clung to all his adult life, while Sue renounces herself and
turns to the church, and self-mortification, for a lifetime of penance. This is in contrast to
everything we have learned about Sue throughout the novel, including her beliefs, her
skepticism, and her sacrilege.
The reader should not mistake Sue’s sudden change in purpose and direction as
selfless. In fact, her self-denying plunge toward penance remains a self-absorbed impulse
that has more than a hint of willful masochism in it. “Our life,” she tells Jude, “has been a
vain attempt at self-delight. But self-abnegation is the higher road. We should mortify the
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flesh—the terrible flesh” (272), and, “I well deserved the scourging I have got! I wish
something would take the evil right out of me, and all my monstrous errors, and all my
sinful ways” (272)! A few lines later, she continues, “[s]elf-renunciation—that’s
everything! I cannot humiliate myself too much. I should like to prick myself all over
with pins and bleed out the badness that’s in me” (273)! Sue’s intense grief, and her
extreme reaction to it, is entirely understandable. But her willing dive into selfabjection—and her graphic, detailed description of what it should entail, are in character
with her histrionic nature. As for the children, according to Sue it is almost as if they had
no purpose of their own but “it is right that they should be [dead]! I am glad—almost.
They were sin-begotten. They were sacrificed to teach me how to live!—their death was
the first stage of my purification” (288). The idea that the children, both Sue’s and notSue’s, should have been born merely to be sacrificed to ultimately give purpose to Sue’s
life reveals Sue’s borderline narcissism.
As for Jude, it is not just the loss of the children, but the loss of Sue as well, that
causes his will to live slip, his health to fade, and sends him to the grave. To Arabella, he
says of Sue that “[t]o save her own soul she lets mine go damn” (297)! Those who are
familiar with Hardy’s other works would not be surprised to find such tragedy befalling
his characters. But with Jude it is an ending that seems almost not so much sad as
unfulfilling. And that is perhaps the point. As David Lodge points out:
There is no suggestion, in the novel, that the protagonists could have achieved
happy and fulfilled lives. Their ideals and aspirations prove to be vain,
impracticable illusions, and when they try alternative courses of action these too
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prove to be disappointing or worse. Jude and Sue are trapped in a maze of
unhappiness, from which there is no escape—except death. (194)
Jude, Sue, and even Little Father Time, are destined to find themselves in a cycle of
despair. But, although the hardships they endure are real, their dissatisfaction with what
life has offered them at this historical moment and with their constrained social status is
the ultimate cause for their abjection, and that dissatisfaction comes from within their
own personalities. Hardy himself, in his Preface to the First Edition, describes his effort
as
a novel addressed by a man to men and women of full age; which attempts to deal
unaffectedly with the fret and fever, derision and disaster, that may press in the
wake of the strongest passion known to humanity; to tell, without a mincing of
words, of a deadly war waged between flesh and spirit; and to point the tragedy of
unfulfilled aims. (5)
The “shattered ideals of the two chief characters” (Hardy 6) is, more than hunger, more
than even loss, what haunts Jude the Obscure. For these characters, life could never
match up to what dreams promised. And that “modern vice of unrest” (69) that Jude feels
in his soul is what causes every other struggle the characters encounter to seem like mere
pantomime.
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CONCLUSION

When any scholar embarks on an academic project, no matter how large or small,
there is one question that one must never let stray from the mind: what is the purpose?
Why study literature, or history, or art? Why spend countless hours laboring over
something that, for many people, has no practical purpose? Scientists do not, for the most
part, have to rationalize their research because it carries (we believe) a utilitarian purpose.
It is the same for economists, mathematicians, and experts in similar fields. But for those
of us in the Humanities, there is more of a need to justify our work. We must consistently
ask ourselves the questions, before they are addressed to us: Why am I studying this?
Why write about it? Who is my audience? And why should any of us care? For those
born and raised with minds like mine, the answer has always been simple: I do it because
literature has always given me pleasure, because history has always fascinated me, and
because I believe that curiosity, in all its forms, should be encouraged and developed.
There are many who share my belief, but not all do. Writing from my place in history—in
the early decades of the twenty-first century—there is a general belief that there are much
more important concerns than those laid out in the previous pages and that, in the most
extreme examples, my labor does not matter at all. Yet when we focus our attention on a
specific period in history, as this study has done, we find the past is not as much a static
record of things that happened as it is a foundation on which we understand our own
place in the world.

104
There are many lessons fin de siècle Europe can teach our own society in the
twenty-first century. Naturally, when we study any period from history—its literature, its
philosophy, its culture and values—we do so from a position of privilege because we
possess an historical knowledge that the people we study did not. For the most part, late
Victorian Europe carried an air of pessimism over it. Concerns over decadence,
degeneration, and national (read: imperial) collapse reflect a culture of uncertainty or,
worse, despair. For decadents like Wilde, ennui was the order of the day. But such a
thorough embrace of boredom as a badge of honor also reflects a nihilism that is often not
fashionable but destructive. Overlaying each of the works discussed in the previous pages
is a dark pall. In Jekyll and Hyde it is a literal fog that was not just a feature of
contemporary London (whose Victorian fog—what we would now call smog—is well
documented), but a literary device used to impress the reader with a sense of foreboding.
For Dorian Gray it surfaces in the characters themselves who, though fashionable, are
largely nihilistic. And Jude the Obscure is not shy about wallowing in the gloom of its
characters’ fates.
The pall that had begun to spread over Europe in the later decades of the nineteenth
century was not, we now know, a momentary cultural and political phase, but the early
wakening of something much, much darker to come.
The characters studied in the previous pages are just as much products of their
society as the authors who created them. When Jekyll devolves into the repulsive Hyde,
his features reflect the racism that pervaded (and, unfortunately, still pervades)
Stevenson’s Europe. Antisemitism is also blatant in The Picture of Dorian Gray. The
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Jewishness of the owner of the theater where Sibyl Vane works is emphasized multiple
times in just a few pages, becoming practically the only definable feature or personality
trait he possesses. His character, though small, is merely a “horrid old Jew” (47) who has
little other purpose than to become a caricature. These sentiments are not limited to the
works I discuss. Racism, and its cousin degeneration, are defining features of other works
of the time, all of which could easily have been used in this study. H.G. Wells’ The
Island of Dr. Moreau, Bram Stoker’s Dracula, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and
Sir Conan Arthur Doyle’s extensive works involving Sherlock Holmes are just a few of
many examples provided by this time period. In The Island of Dr. Moreau, the notion of
degeneration lies at the forefront. Like the works analyzed in the current study, Wells’
short novel focuses on an issue that deeply concerned society in the 1890’s. In this case,
it was animal vivisection. The human/animal hybrids encountered by Prendick in the
novel are seen as abominations that eventually abandon their humanness and revert to
their animal nature. Dracula should also be viewed as a novel reflecting the views of its
time. Fear of the Other is predominant here. Dracula himself calls to mind fears of
foreign invasion, since Count Dracula is an Eastern foreigner who lands in England and
begins sucking the blood of England’s women, turning them to creatures like him in the
process. He is also a symbol of degeneration, viewed as having child-like instincts and a
criminal brain. His degenerate nature causes degeneration in the civilized men and
women of England he encounters. Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is often rightfully studied
as a novel about the horrors of colonialism and the dangers of mixing cultures, in this
case “civilized” versus “uncivilized.” But Kurtz’s degeneration also situates him
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perfectly as a symbol of abjection caused by a decay in culture and values. The Europe
Marlow returns to at the end of the novel is seemingly civilized at the surface but hides a
rottenness that Marlow, through his encounters with the “Other,” can now recognize. And
For Sherlock Holmes, racial stereotypes running throughout the stories reflect an unease
with the “Other” that was seen as one of the dangers of colonial encounters. These are
just a few literary examples. Every single one of those works, and more, could easily
have fit into my thesis.
It is not just racism but politics that was beginning to form a feature of the pall I
speak of as spreading over late nineteenth century Europe (though racism and politics are
often intertwined). For Britain, it was Empire that was its main concern. After all, it was
proudly the Empire on which “the sun never set.” The failings of imperial ambition are
now, after decolonization, well acknowledged. But in much of the British imagination of
the time, imperialism was seen as a civilizing mission. Kipling’s call to embrace
colonialism as “The White Man’s Burden” allowed those sympathetic to imperialism—in
Europe and elsewhere—to find moral as well as financial satisfaction in the pursuit of
land and spread of culture. For some, the lure of “The British Empire” as an almost quasimystical symbol of English superiority lent a particular pathos to its eventual downfall.
Acknowledging this, Brantlinger posits that “[i]mperialism itself, as an ideology or
political faith, functioned as a partial substitute for declining or fallen Christianity and for
declining faith in Britain’s future” (228). Devotion to such a mission and such a belief,
however, was met with the increasing disruption found throughout the colonies, and
within the borders of Britain proper. Brantlinger continues: “After the mid-Victorian
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years the British found it increasingly difficult to think of themselves as inevitably
progressive; they began worrying instead about the degeneration of their institutions,
their culture, their racial ‘stock’” (230). Belief in the value of colonialism, and its
civilizing mission, met with uncertainty about its continuing future. Racial and cultural
pride facing inevitable cultural decay is one of the driving forces behind abjection. It is
during this period of increasing anxiety that the works analyzed in this project were
written.
The current study focuses on a very particular time and place but, with a small
amount of revision, my thesis could work for other historical eras as well. A student of
twentieth century German culture will find much material for a study of abjection. After
World War I and the collapse of several European heads of state, an upending in societal
structure and a void in leadership allowed authoritarian powers were able to take hold. In
Germany, the short lived Weimar Republic was an era of decadence and cultural
disruption that is not entirely dissimilar to the decadence and disruption that we see in the
late nineteenth century Britain of this current study. It is here, also, that abjection found
its home. Like England of the 1890’s, Germany of the 1920’s was a time of transition. It
was also a time that saw a flourishing in art and design that, seemingly conversely but not
surprisingly, coincides with a rise in abject thought. German Expressionism, in both film
and painting, reflect a society struggling with first the coming and later the repercussions
of a costly and gruesome war. In both painting and cinema, figures and scenes are
distorted to such an uncanny extent that the viewer may feel the disorientation, despair,
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and yes, abjection, felt by a nation that had just endured one ordeal, and was about to face
an even greater one.
It is also during this period that the roots of fascism gained ground, particularly in
Germany, though its influence spread elsewhere. Fascism, for many, provided a
comforting sense of cultural protection. At the same time, fascism reflects a culture in
crisis. Healthy societies do not become fascist, only sick ones. A sick society may turn its
self-abjection outward, projecting self-doubt onto a scapegoat. This results in racial
persecution of nearly unimaginable scales, resulting in horrors such as the Holocaust.
Fear of cultural decay causes a society to find solace in a reversion to notions of racial
purity and national supremacy. Such societies not only reject but fear any symbol of
supposed “degeneracy,” whether seen in literature, art, or the human “Other.” For
Germany, common antisemitism like that seen in Dorian Gray takes on new meanings,
and the supposed cause of cultural decay must be eliminated. What was once an idea
becomes a reality. For Nazi Germany, so called “degenerate art” became a symbol of a
society in need of fixing. Ironically, the 1937 exhibition that featured degenerate art
likely served to create an interest in the very same artworks that were deemed unfit for
society. Also ironically, the confiscation and sales of these artworks provided economic
fuel for the Third Reich and its ensuing atrocities. While “degenerate art” proudly
immerses itself in abjection, the society that rejects such displays of decadence also,
perversely, dwells within abjection.
These events, though still decades away, saw their roots formed in the period
focused on in this study. Perhaps, eerily, this sense of pessimism, collapse, and abjection
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that pervades fin de siècle thought and literature was more prescient than we
acknowledge. Society was collapsing during this time, and its authors saw, felt, and knew
it. Their abjection, loathing, and despair are not merely literary devices but an honest
documentation of something looming very largely in the fabric of their society. If we take
this view of history, which I have attempted to do in this study, there is no doubt that it
has lasting ramifications for our understanding of ourselves. Their experience, after all, is
our inheritance. As of the time of this writing, the United States is currently experiencing
its own form of cultural and political abjection. We are currently witnessing a society as
culturally and politically divided as the one examined in this thesis. Much of this current
feeling of abjection comes from the same insecurity felt by late Victorian Britain. The
future is uncertain, and the need for a racial or political scapegoat is present. There are
even accusations of degeneracy that eerily reflect those experienced in 1940’s Germany.
White rage, toxic masculinity, and economic fury and indignity seem to be present
everywhere. In these times of abject uncertainty, we must be vigilant, and recall the
warnings of history. We can find those warnings found in no better place than in
literature.
On a final note, we return to Kristeva, who asks rhetorically, “[d]oes one write
under any other condition than being possessed by abjection, in an indefinite catharsis”
(208)? The answer may be more complex than Kristeva hints at but she does assert that
“all literature is probably a version of the apocalypse that seems to me rooted, no matter
what its socio-historical conditions might be, on the fragile border…where identities
(subject/object, etc.) do not exist or only barely so—double, fuzzy, heterogeneous,
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animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject” (207). This statement easily applies to a figure
like Jekyll, whose metamorphosis into the animal-like Hyde is a reflection of an identity
in crisis. Or Dorian Gray, unable to find his own identity and relentlessly trying on
others, while his hidden portrait alters as the original sinks further into abjection and
decadence. Or Jude Fawley and Sue Bridehead, whose differing personalities are only
gendered manifestations of a single being in crisis, and who ultimately change identities
as they face their own personal apocalypse. In every one of these cases, abjection is the
vehicle that drives the characters’ destruction. It is also, however, the catalyst for
transformation in whatever form it takes.
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